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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates factors that predict compliance with international 
regimes, specifically the Non-Proliferation Regime. Generally accepted in 
international relations literature, is Krasner’s (1983) definition that regimes are 
“sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given [issue] area of 
international relations.” Using institutionalization as a framework, I hypothesize 
that compliance is a function of the respect for which a nation has for the rule 
of law. I investigate the NP regime through the lens of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540, a mandate for member nations to enact domestic 
legislation criminalizing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
Using NP regime compliance and implementation of UNSCR 1540’s mandates 
as dependent variables, I test the hypotheses with the following independent 
variables: rule of law, political competition, and regional compliance. I also 
present qualitative case studies on Argentina, South Africa, and Malaysia. The 
quantitative results of these analyses indicated a strong relationship between 
rule of law and regional compliance and a nation’s compliance with the overall 
NP regime and implementation of UNSCR 1540. These results indicate a nation 
will institutionalize the NP norms, and comply with the specifics of 
implementation. The results of in-depth analysis of Argentina, South Africa, 
and Malaysia showed that predicting an individual nation’s compliance is more 
complex than descriptions of government capacity or geography. Argentina and 
South Africa, expected by the hypotheses to exhibit low to medium compliance 
and implementation, scored high and well above their region for both 
measures. Malaysia, expected to score high in compliance, scored low. Findings 
thus reveal that rule of law is probably less influential on individual cases and 
regional compliance and cooperation better predictors of a nation’s compliance 
with a security regime. 
 
Keywords: compliance, institutionalization, rule of law, security regimes, 
UNSCR 1540.
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Introduction 
 I find it sad, yet an unfortunate reality, that even once all declared 
chemical weapons stockpiles have been destroyed by the member 
states, the people of our global community may still be threatened 
by the possibility that individuals, cults, criminals and terrorists 
may nevertheless use chemicals in a hostile manner to cause death 
and destruction. 
Ambassador Eric M. Javits,  
Speech to the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
October 14, 2008  
 
 As the quote from Ambassador Javits highlights, the danger from WMD 
is shifting from nations to non-state actors.  This shift is problematic since 
sovereignty is the basis of the international system within which nations 
reside.  The concept of law among nations requires sovereign states to enact, 
enable, and enforce binding rules. When a non-state actor injects himself into 
the system and has the ability to influence members of the system, 
international law – the agreement among nations – sometimes fails.  Domestic 
law provides avenues for controlling the actions of non-state individuals and 
groups residing within a given state. 
Regimes are one way by which groups, including states, attempt to 
influence behavior across many different activities.  Regimes are “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given [issue] area of 
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international relations.”1  Regimes enable groups, including states, and attempt 
to influence behavior across many different activities with the goal of 
predictable behavior and cooperation. 
Each regime consists of rules governing the behavior of the regime 
members.  Both states and non-state actors can be members of regimes.  For 
example, there are regimes concerning banking, fishing, and human rights.  
This effort considers regimes that operate at the interstate level and more 
specifically, those in the security arena. 
Security regimes are concerned with those activities that endanger 
individual states and the world in general.  The types of security regimes 
include arms control regimes, communication regimes, and non- and counter- 
proliferation regimes.  In the case of non-proliferation (NP) and counter-
proliferation (CP) regimes, these entities are concerned with stopping the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conventional weapons, and the 
component parts of both.  Used throughout this paper, the terms non-
proliferation and counter-proliferation include the use nonmilitary means to 
“stop, slow, and roll back [WMD] programs,” and military means of defeating 
the threat or use of WMD.2   
                                                          
1 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,” in International Regimes, ed., Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 2. 
2 Barry R. Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation:  U.S. Military Responses to NBC 
Proliferation Threats (Westport:  Praeger Security International, 1999), 47. United States 
Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
October 17, 2008 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ (accessed June 4, 2009). 
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The central question of this dissertation is what predicts the success of 
the non-proliferation regime?  In this case, I define success as enactment of 
domestic legislation in support of nonproliferation efforts. 
One of the challenges for regimes is in many cases regime membership is 
at the state level, but the behavior the regime seeks to influence is at the 
individual level.  A citizen without official capacity can act outside of lawful 
authority and proliferate WMD with private citizens or even other states.  Thus, 
the state must regulate the behavior of people within its borders.   
This gap between sovereign obligation and individual action is where the 
international regime may break down.  In order to bridge this gap, states can 
create domestic enablers to support the international regime.  Among the 
domestic enablers is codification of the regime’s tenets in state law.  For 
security regimes, and the NP regime in particular, state members must enact 
domestic laws to stop proliferation to and among non-state actors in order to 
indicate compliance to other regime members. 
The NP regime provides an excellent example of the problem of 
determining regime effectiveness.  For example, there are three prominent parts 
to the international non-proliferation regime:  the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), the Convention on Toxin and Biological Weapons (BTWC), and the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons 
Convention or CWC).  These three agreements have different memberships 
(though the CWC is now almost universal), different requirements, and 
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different enforcement procedures.  All are devoted to stopping the spread of 
WMD; none of the signatories to these agreements desires anyone else to gain 
access to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.  Common among the 
agreements are rules concerning manufacture, storage, transfer, and 
destruction of WMD.3 
The United Nations (UN) is involved in non-proliferation efforts as well.  
The UN is the depositary for most agreements and it has a special relationship 
with other conventions and agencies involved in NP and CP.  For example, the 
director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can attend (but not 
vote) in UN General Assembly (UNGA) meetings and the UN Director-General 
can do the same at IAEA meetings.  This close relationship leads many to 
believe that the IAEA is an arm of the UN.  It is not. 
During September 2003, President George W. Bush spoke at the UN and 
called for a deeper commitment to non-proliferation.  He called for nations “to 
criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to enact strict 
export controls consistent with international standards, and to secure any and 
all sensitive materials within their own borders.”4  The content of his speech 
followed the public introduction of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) in May 2003 and led directly to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1540.  
                                                          
3 Only the CWC contains language mandating national legislation to assist the state in 
preventing proliferation. 
4 George W. Bush, “Address to the United Nations,” September 23, 2003.  
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.23.03.html (accessed May 25, 2009). 
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UNSCR 1540 is a unique Security Council initiative.  First, this 
resolution is one of general applicability, rather than narrowly focused on a 
single nation or event.  It provides an umbrella over the other non-proliferation 
treaties – mentioning them by name – but does not require a nation to accede 
to any treaty.  Second, the resolution obligates nations to enact domestic 
legislation to control proliferation through law enforcement aimed at border 
control and trafficking in WMD.5  Third, UNSCR 1540 specifically references 
terrorists and targets non-state actors.  The Security Council promulgates all of 
these obligations under the UN’s Chapter VII authority – the same authority 
necessary for the use of force.6   
UNSCR 1540 is a piece of the NP regime.  This dissertation analyzes the 
assumption that domestic legislation will prove effective in NP efforts, by using 
institutionalization, a measure first developed by Samuel Huntington and 
adapted by Roger Smith, to predict regime success/effectiveness.  There are 
four parts of institutionalization:  adaptability, complexity, autonomy and 
unity.   
These four parts require definition.  Adaptability includes chronological 
age, generational age, and functional age - the ability of the regime to first 
                                                          
5 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004), 28 April 2004, http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/9871498.html (accessed May 10, 2009).   
6 Chapter VII of the UN Charter is entitled Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches 
of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.  Of course, the UN tries to resolve differences without 
force, but Article 42 of Chapter VII states that the Security Council “may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”  United Nations Charter, 24 October 1945.  
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml (accessed May 2, 2012). 
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perform its chartered function, and later take on and perform additional 
functions.7  Complexity is a function of the overlapping nature of regimes and 
includes both the change in number and type of functions performed by the 
regime and the ties that the regime has to other regimes.8  Autonomy is the 
independence of the regime from other political organizations and the 
enforcement mechanisms of the regime.9  Unity is the measure of the degree of 
agreement by the countries subject to the regime on the ultimate purposes and 
methods of the regime.10   
The NP regime is highly institutionalized with respect to adaptability, 
complexity, and autonomy; yet, it is the measure of unity that illustrates 
compliance.  The literature provides little in terms of reliable measures to 
determine whether a regime member agrees on the ultimate purposes and 
methods of the regime.   
Nations that are members of a regime share agreement on the principles 
and norms of the regime.  The existence of the agreements mentioned above as 
well as UNSCR 1540 indicates the existence of an international norm that 
disfavors proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.11  Despite these positive 
                                                          
7 Another way of looking at functional age is the regime’s “robustness or staying power in the 
face of exogenous challenges.” Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, 
“Interests, Power, Knowledge:  The Study of International Regimes,” Mershon International 
Studies Review 40:2 (October 1996), 181.   
8 Roger K. Smith, “Institutionalization as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 237. 
9 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven:  Yale University 
Press, 1968), 20. 
10 Roger K. Smith, “Institutionalization as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 238. 
11 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 2005), 58.   
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indicators, with notable exceptions like North Korea, the regime does not 
exhibit a universal commitment to counter- and non-proliferation.  
Enforcement is nonexistent in some states and uneven in others, especially 
when judged by comparison to other nations.  Within this dissertation, I argue 
that enacting domestic legislation is a good proxy for unity – the final piece of 
institutionalization.  This project is an attempt to validate the idea that unity 
plus the other elements of institutionalization, predicts regime success. 
To explore these concepts, this dissertation proceeds as follows:  the next 
chapter is a literature review of regime theory that reviews the relationship 
between regimes and international relations.  Then I describe regimes and 
identify their major elements and the points of convergence within the 
literature.  The following section explores regime formation and looks at 
spontaneous, imposed, and negotiated regimes and some of the implications of 
each.   Once that is developed, I discuss the various reasons regimes are 
successful, looking specifically at the characteristics of the regime and the 
member nation.  Chapter three specifically traces the nonproliferation regime 
and discusses the impact of UNSCR 1540 on it.  I will introduce the factors 
that predict nonproliferation regime compliance. 
In chapter four, I take a closer look at security regimes and develop a 
model to examine the predictors used to determine regime success.  Within this 
chapter, I address the central arguments of the dissertation in detail.  I draw 
from the regime literature two factors of regime success – rule of law and 
regional compliance – and, controlling for government, I hypothesize that these 
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indicators will help predict regime success.  I operationalize the variables, 
analyze them, and explore the value of my hypotheses. 
Chapter five applies insights from the empirical testing chapter to case 
studies of Argentina, South Africa, and Malaysia.  These nations each have a 
definable connection to non-proliferation and cover the spectrum of rule of law 
operationalization. I anticipate a distinct constructivist flavor to the case 
studies. While system cooperation – in this case compliance – lends itself to 
institutionalist theories, they do not easily translate into predictions of 
individual state behavior. The case studies will help flesh out the findings from 
the empirical test. 
  Chapter six explores the implications and significance of this research 
and the conclusion.  This will include a discussion that includes the 
applicability of the model to the broader literature on regimes and to security 
policy.
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Two: International Relations, Regimes, Non- and Counter-Proliferation  
Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law 
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time. 
 
Louis Henkin 
How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy  
Introduction 
This chapter will provide an overview of the international relations 
literature as it pertains to regimes, especially security regimes, and specifically 
non-proliferation (NP) and counter-proliferation (CP) regimes. In later chapters, 
I explore the non-proliferation regime, its formation, and the predictors of its 
success. This chapter lays the foundation for the study of the non-proliferation 
regime and later case studies on other regimes. 
The non-proliferation regime’s foundations are in agreements between 
and among states as well as directives from the United Nations. The lenses 
through which states view the value and enforceability of the agreements drives 
both individual state action and predictability of compliance. The sections 
below explore the literature on regimes with the goal of identifying the core 
elements of regime success and developing hypotheses for research. While the 
literature review is broad, I am focusing on the aspects of regimes that directly 
affect the success or failure of security regimes in particular. 
Regimes and IR Theory: 
 Three main international relations explanatory approaches of state 
behavior are realism, liberalism, and constructivism; each includes related 
propositions that seek to explain state behavior, especially regarding 
10 
 
cooperation and competition. The influence of regimes on state behavior looks 
very different from each of these theoretical viewpoints. This section begins 
with a discussion of realism, the dominant theory during the last half of the 
twentieth century. 
IR Theory Underpinnings – Realism and Neorealism 
 Descriptions of realism invariably include references to self-interested 
behavior, anarchy, and the inconsequence of domestic politics. Contending 
that self-interest alone and a quest for power motivates states, realists believe 
that regimes do little to influence state behavior.12 International relations take 
place in an anarchic world filled with states that are seeking self-
preservation.13  The anarchic nature of the system drives states to an egoistic 
stance in international relations; not only is there no central agency available 
for enforcement, but, more critically, there is no central agency available for 
protection.14  In the realist view, states pay little or no attention to the 
influence of domestic politics and consider only themselves as the influential 
actors in the world order. So compliance with international law is not through 
effective enforcement or obligation, but merely coincident with the state’s 
egoistic perspective at any given time.15 Realist states always seek to gain 
                                                          
12 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939:  An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (London:  Harper Torchbooks, 1964), 158. 
13 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 118. 
14 Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato. "Balancing in Neorealism." International Security 
40, no. 2 (Fall2015 2015), 55. 
15 Oona A. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law Journal 111, 
no. 8 (June 2002), 1946. 
11 
 
additional power. Realism posits that state behavior is independent of 
subnational influence. 
International institutions thus have little or no effect on a state’s decision 
to comply. Henkin asserted that a nation will observe an international law only 
if the advantages of compliance outweigh the disadvantages of violating the 
law.16 Interdependence, in the realist view, is an indication of weakness 
because the state is not self-sufficient, relying on other states for goods vital to 
existence.  
When considering the international relations between states, neorealists 
focus on the anarchy of the international system. This system focus drives 
them to give less weight to state-level politics and explanations. Neorealists 
posit states will engage in autonomous self-help, in other words, they will act 
alone if necessary.17 Under neorealism, cooperation is only attractive when it 
benefits one state more than another.  
The neorealist viewpoint is first concerned with relative gains; thus, a 
neorealist is unwilling to cooperate, even though his state gains, if a rival state 
gains more. Neorealist states, like realist states, are distrustful of other states. 
International agreements that limit gains remain unattractive because one 
party may cheat and gain more than the other gains. This viewpoint negates 
one of the advantages of regimes - the ability to make power gains and losses 
                                                          
16 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1968), 49. 
17 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy no. 
110 (Spring 1998), 30; Parent and Rosato, "Balancing in Neorealism," 52. 
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transparent among the members. Realists and neorealists thus take a negative 
view of cooperation, contending that anarchy “fosters competition and conflict 
among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate.”18 
IR Theory Underpinnings – Liberalism and Institutionalism 
The liberal view differs from the realist view, especially in the areas of 
cooperation, domestic politics, anarchy, and the influence of regimes.  The 
liberal view includes domestic politics as a determinant of state action.  For a 
liberal, the lack of a central agency to enforce compliance is not a barrier to, 
but a catalyst for cooperation.  Liberals like regimes because regimes are 
among the international institutions that act as independent forces to facilitate 
interaction and transactions concerning subjects of conflict or potential 
conflict. The result of these interactions is cooperation. Continued cooperation 
helps reduce future transaction costs, which, in turn, promotes more 
cooperation. More than that, however, regimes “facilitate the making of specific 
cooperative agreements among governments.” This liberal lens embraces the 
transparency and informational advantages provided by regimes and the 
benefits from reduced verification costs and repeated interactions.19   
                                                          
18 Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation:  A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism:  The Contemporary Debate, David A. 
Baldwin, ed. (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1993): 116; Parent and Rosato, "Balancing 
in Neorealism," 54. 
19 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
2005 ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 62; Joseph M. Grieco, a realist, takes 
the view that this is naïve and that states should limit their interaction to friendly states whose 
relative gains will not hurt you.  Of course, this is not possible in a CP regime.  Full cooperation 
is the optimum.  Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation…,” 132-33. 
13 
 
These benefits alleviate the liberal’s fear of cheating when party to an 
international agreement that restricts a state’s quest for power. Cheating 
provides a lower payoff (gains) for one side. Even though liberals are more 
concerned with absolute gains (versus the realist concern with relative gains), 
fairness is critical. They will accept a lower gain if gotten through open and fair 
exchange.  Liberals assert that regimes serve a vital role because regimes 
promote cooperation and reduce cheating between members.20 This view 
recognizes that in a long-term relationship, cooperation is the best way to 
optimize state interests. 
The neoliberals characterize the system as anarchical, but believe 
cooperation mitigates anarchy. This view sees regimes as positive forces that 
reinforce reciprocity in state dealings by lengthening the shadow of the future 
and guaranteeing a longer relationship.21  In other words, the benefits of 
present cooperation outweigh the potential benefits of future competition.22  
Regimes provide greater certainty for the course of future competition.  
Liberal Institutionalism recognizes that more than states make up the 
international system. Institutionalists do not assume that states are the sole, 
nor always the most important, actors in the international system.23 This 
approach “argues that conditions outside the states, such as international 
                                                          
20 Keohane, After Hegemony…, 9, 26. 
21 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy:  Strategies 
and Institutions,” in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1986), 250. 
22 See, Keohane, After Hegemony. 
23 Helen V. Milner, “Rationalizing Politics:  The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, 
and Comparative Politics,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1999), 761. 
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institutions and economic interdependence, can materially influence the 
interests, objectives, and policy instruments that states choose and pursue.”24 
Institutionalists assert that a regime has a power of its own and choosing 
membership indicates a willingness to comply its construct.  As a result, the 
rules and norms of the regime exert a great influence on the actions of the 
members.25   
Liberal institutionalists assert that regimes blur the hard and fast lines 
that separate states and encourage increased dialogue among more actors.  
States relinquish some sovereignty to the regime, diluting some of the central 
power of a state and limiting the effect of self-interested decision-making, 
without directly challenging sovereignty.26   
IR Theory Underpinnings – Constructivism 
 Constructivism is more of a social theory that rejects strict adherence to 
the Realist and Liberal explanatory theories and their interpretation of the 
structural aspects of the international system.27 Constructivism posits the idea 
that states will embrace or reject an object – in this case the foundations of the 
NP regime – based upon the meaning the object has for the state.28 If a state 
                                                          
24 Joseph M. Grieco "Liberal International Theory and Imagining the End of the Cold War." 
British Journal Of Politics & International Relations 11, no. 2 (2009), 193. 
25 Harald Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The 
Case of Security Regimes,” in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed., Volker Rittberger 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993), 392. 
26 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence 2nd ed. (New York:  
Harper Collins, 1989), 30-31. 
27 Robert William Flawith, "The Regressing 'Culture of Anarchy' in Ancient China and its 
Implications for Wendt's Progressive Constructivism." Australian Journal Of International Affairs 
65, no. 3 (June 2011), 265. 
28 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992), 397. 
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embraces the principle that proliferation of WMD is a negative, then it will act 
in a way to prevent proliferations. Constructivism also recognizes that 
interaction among states will influence the meaning of the object.29 Thus, the 
players with whom a state interacts – a potential economic and geographic 
variable in position development – influence a state’s position on a principle. 
More importantly for issues of regime compliance, Constructivism takes a 
progressive position on cooperation, asserting that each additional instance of 
cooperation will become a foundation for future action. Thus, as the 
international system matures, regime compliance by additional member 
nations is a logical function of the compliance previously exhibited by other 
member nations.30 
What are Regimes? 
International regimes help governments to assess others’ 
reputations by providing standards of behavior against which 
performance can be measured, by linking these standards to specific 
issues, and by providing forums, often through international 
organizations, in which these evaluations can be made. 
 
Robert O. Keohane,  
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord 
in the World Political Economy 
 
The sections that follow describe regimes in general and illustrate that 
the literature suggests solid points of convergence from which to analyze 
regime success.  I begin with various definitions of regimes.  These discussions 
                                                          
29 Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It…," 403. 
30 Flawith, "The Regressing 'Culture of Anarchy'…,” 267. 
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all support the long-known realization that regimes affect the behavior of 
sovereign nations. 
Regimes are part of the fabric of international relations. The academic 
community generally accepts Stephen Krasner’s definition as the starting point 
for research into regimes. He defined regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given [issue] area of international relations.”31 
Harald Müller observed that, “A regime exists when all four elements can be 
identified and when the regime controls enough variables in a given issue area 
to affect (if obeyed) parties’ behavior by channeling or terminating self-help 
with regard to the regulated variables.”32   
Regimes contain substantive, procedural, and implementation 
components.33  The substantive components include the “relevant subject 
group, the goal of the regime and “circumstances under which the regime 
operates.”34  The substantive component incorporates the principles and norms 
of the regime.35  Principles are the broad overarching purposes pursued by 
                                                          
31 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,” in International Regimes, ed., Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 2. 
32 Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments…,” 361. 
33 Oran R. Young, “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” World Politics 32 
(April 1980):  333. 
34 Young, “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” 333-35. 
35 Norms in the security arena finds their base in the Concert of Europe that established that 
“states have a right to security and independence, states should respect each other’s legitimate 
interests and observe international law, and differences should be settled by diplomacy and 
negotiation.”  Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, 
and International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 19. 
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regime members; they “are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude.” 36  
Principles and norms are the basic outlines of the regime within which the 
rules and decision-making procedures can change.   
Norms are “prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a 
sense of obligation, a sense that they ought to be followed” and “standards of 
behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations.”37  Norms provide the right 
and wrong of a regime.  The fact that some actors do not adhere to norms 
causes them to exist.38  An additional way to view norms is as the “good” that 
regimes deliver. This is the Garden of Eden argument.  Society does not 
legislate the wearing of clothing unless someone runs around naked.  An 
additional way to view norms is as the “good” that regimes deliver.  When 
members add a moral element to norms, their attainment approaches an 
obligation for regime members.39 
The procedural component of regimes incorporates the rules and 
decision-making processes. Regimes, through the procedural components of 
rules and decision-making procedures, make agreement easier by providing 
                                                          
36 Keohane, After Hegemony, 58; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New 
Sovereignty:  Compliance with Treaties in International Regulatory Regimes (Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 1995), 113. 
37 Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, 113; Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime 
Consequences…,” 2. 
38 Brad Roberts, “Nonproliferation – Challenges Old accnd New,” in Avoiding the Abyss:  
Progress, Shortfalls, and the Way Ahead in Combating the WMD Threat, ed., Barry R. Schneider 
and Jim A. Davis (Westport:  Praeger Security International, 2006):  91. 
39 Keohane, After Hegemony, 57-58.  c.f. “[A]lthough international regimes may be valuable to 
their creators, they do not necessarily improve world welfare.  They are not ipso facto ‘good.’” at 
73. 
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legal frameworks for establishing compliance and punishment.40  “Rules are 
specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action.  Rules require “prescribed 
classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways.”41  In addition, rules 
provide a frame of reference for comparison when violations occur.42 
President Reagan provided two prominent examples of using rules as a 
reference point for Congressional opposition to rally against executive action.  
During 1986, President Reagan announced a unilateral withdrawal from the 
un-ratified SALT II limitations.  The break came as the US retrofitted additional 
B-52s with air-launched cruise missiles.  The Congress opposed the President’s 
action and considered binding the next year’s budget to the renewed 
compliance with the treaty.43  A similar incident occurred when he proposed 
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).  Opponents successfully framed 
opposition around the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the SDI program lapsed 
from lack of support.44    
Decision-making procedures describe the way in which the regime 
governs itself.  They can be more or less formal.  “Decision-making procedures 
                                                          
40 Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," International Organization 36, 
no. 2 (1982): 338. 
41 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society:  A Study of World Order in World Politics (New York:  
Columbia University Press, 1977), 54. 
42 Harald Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments:  The 
Case of Security Regimes,” in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993), 383. 
43 Condoleezza Rice, “SALT and the Search for a Security Regime,” in U.S. – Soviet Security 
Cooperation:  Achievements, Failures, Lessons, ed., Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, 
Alexander Dallin (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1988), 298-9. 
44 Harald Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments:  The 
Case of Security Regimes,” in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993), 383. 
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are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”45  The 
procedures include the “arrangements for resolving situations requiring social 
or collective choices,” and include the how of regime implementation.46 The 
bargaining (or lack thereof) in which regime members engage in order to 
promulgate rules for the regime reflects the decision-making procedures of the 
regime. 
Other theorists offer definitions that offer variations on the concept that 
regimes contain specific elements and have the ability to affect international 
behavior.  For example, Ernst B. Haas defined regimes as “man-
made…arrangements peculiar to substantive issue-areas in international 
relations that are characterized by the condition of complex interdependence:  
neither hierarchy nor anarchy prevails and states rarely practice self-help.”47  
Oran Young described regimes as “social institutions governing the actions of 
those interested in specifiable activities,” manifested by “patterns of practice 
around which expectations converge.”48  Müller narrowed this definition to 
include regulation of “certain aspects of security relationships between 
states.”49   
                                                          
45 Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences…,” 2. 
46 Young, “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” 336. 
47 Ernst B. Haas, “Words Can Hurt You; or, Who said What to Whom About Regimes,” in 
International Regimes, ed., Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 27. 
48 Young, “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” 332. 
49 Harald Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments:  The 
Case of Security Regimes,” in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed., Volker Rittberger 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993), 361. 
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The actors that Krasner described are sovereign nations.50  Regimes can 
thus cause friction within and among states because regimes sometimes 
attempt to limit state sovereignty.51  Sovereign nations may still make decisions 
contrary to the regime, but they do so with peril.  The regime has a memory 
and short-term self-interested decisions may have long-term effects accrue to a 
state that are much worse than foregoing the current opportunity.  
Regimes govern the actions of the members as they pertain to the specific 
issue-area.  They serve as a political authority within the international system 
in that they represent a convergence of “principles about fact, causation, and 
rectitude, as well as political rights and obligations that are regarded as 
legitimate.”52  Regimes are important because they enhance the operation of 
the international political system in the absence of a centralized government.53  
Regimes can also affect non-state actors in that they “order and absorb 
the mobilized participation of new and old states as well as non-state actors.”54  
Regimes cover many areas in which non-state actors are among the primary 
participants.  The international monetary regime includes standards under 
                                                          
50 Young, “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” 333. 
51 Young, “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” 343. 
52 John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change:  Embedded 
Liberalism in Postwar Economic Order," in Theory and Structure in International Political 
Economy:  An International Organizational Reader, ed. Charles Lipson and Benjamin J. Cohen 
(Cambridge:  The MIT Press, 1999), 246. 
53 Keohane, After Hegemony, 63. 
54 Roger K. Smith, “Institutionalization as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 234.   
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which banks transact business across borders.  The fisheries regime affects the 
private fishing boat flying a national flag.  
The ability of a regime to affect both states and non-state actors 
highlights the fact that regimes must focus on specific issue-areas rather than 
merely providing broad guidance for state behavior.  “Issue areas are…defined 
as sets of issues that are…dealt with in common negotiations and by the same, 
or closely coordinated, bureaucracies.”55  Issue-areas emerge, rise, and fall in 
prominence depending upon the context of the age.  “Issue-areas…consist of 
one or more…inseparably connected objects of contention and of the behavior 
directed to them.  The boundaries of issue areas are determined by the 
perceptions of the participating actors.”56 
While Krasner identified rules and decision-making processes as parts of 
regimes, these can be more or less formal, causing problems in regime 
identification.57  Simmons and Martin solve the identification problem by 
simply conflating the terminology and lumping regimes under the more general 
heading international institutions.58 UNSCR 1540 has very specific 
requirements that will form the basis of the analysis I undertake in chapter 
four. The formality of rules and decision-making procedures is a reflection of 
                                                          
55 Keohane, After Hegemony, 61.   
56 Manfred Efinger and Michael Zürn, “Explaining Conflict Management in East-West Relation:  
A Quantitative Test of Problem-Structural Typologies,” in International Regimes in East-West 
Politics, ed. Volker Rittberger (London:  Pinter, 1990):  68. 
57 Oran R. Young, “Regime Dynamics:  The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” in 
International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 93. 
58 Beth A. Simmons and Lisa Martin, “International Organisations and Institutions,” Handbook 
of International Relations Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (eds.) (London et 
al.: Sage, 2002), 194. 
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the forces that formed the regime. I address this latter point in the next 
section. 
Regime Formation: 
There are three types of regimes, each determined by their formation 
characteristics: spontaneous, negotiated, and imposed.59  Spontaneous regimes 
simply reflect a convergence of expectations among members.60  Negotiated and 
imposed regimes are the two types of regimes generally found in the security 
arena.  The characteristics of a negotiated regime include high transactions 
costs in initial bargaining and a tendency toward greater restrictiveness over 
time.61  The primary feature of a negotiated regime is that the participants 
agreed upon the terms. Practically, all regimes tend to resemble contracts.   
In order to achieve agreement and begin recognized compliance, the 
parties sometimes leave the contract ambiguous.  This ambiguity leads to real 
and alleged violations and is a problem source for the regime.62  A good 
example of this is the space regime.  The founding members of the regime 
consciously failed to define the term “space” because any attempt to do so 
would hopelessly bog down negotiations.63  In addition, the ambiguity may also 
cause a signing and ratification slowdown.  This sometimes results in term 
clarification or in reservations attached by the nation at ratification.  Krasner’s 
                                                          
59 Young, “Regime Dynamics…,” 97. 
60 Young, “Regime Dynamics…,” 98. 
61 Young, “Regime Dynamics…,” 105. 
62 Young, “International Regimes…,” 350. 
63 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik:  Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (New York:  Frank 
Cass Publishers, 2006), 114. 
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distinction among the mechanisms of formation is important because it 
highlights the fact that regimes can emerge without a hegemon when important 
mutual interests are present.64 
Hegemons or even victors in a war sometimes impose regimes.  The 
hegemon’s influence is among the forces behind an “uninterested” nation’s 
accession to a regime.65  Imposed regimes are the product of “some 
combination of coercion, cooptation, and the manipulation of incentives.”66  An 
example of manipulation of incentives is the post-World War II European 
economic system put in place by the US.  The US promoted a Western Europe 
preference area in order to provide the Europeans with much needed cash, end 
colony-based economies, and promote trade.  This activity made up for, in large 
measure, the trade these nations lost after the fall of the colonial system.67    
The definition given above for imposed regimes tends to oversimplify the 
decision-making process that a lesser state must go through when joining a 
regime.  Given that the lesser state may gain less from the regime (is Fiji really 
worried about a biological attack?) it nevertheless chooses to join a regime, 
even if its choice, though not great, is the best of the alternatives.68  How then 
                                                          
64 Keohane, After Hegemony, 50. 
65 Keohane recognized that hegemons are not always necessary for regime formation noting 
that “[e]ven if no hegemon exists, a small number of strong actors may be able to 
accomplish…[the] task together.”  Keohane, After Hegemony, 50-51, 77. 
66 Young, “Regime Dynamics…,” 100.    
67 Robert Gilpin, “The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations,” International Organization 
25, no. 3 (Summer 1971):  411-412. 
68 Keohane, After Hegemony, 72. 
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can one nation or group of nations impose a regime upon a nation that may 
prefer no action as opposed to a positive or negative commitment to a regime? 
Hegemons are the most powerful actors in the system and able to directly 
influence many lesser states.  Imposed regimes are not this simple to 
categorize, however, since some members negotiate agreements that they later 
impose on others.69 Keohane recognized that hegemons are not always 
necessary for regime formation noting that “[e]ven if no hegemon exists, a small 
number of strong actors may be able to accomplish…[the] task together.”70 
The ability of a number of powerful states, like those that comprise the 
permanent five (P-5) in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to impose 
conditions on other UN member states is similar.  As Young observed, “Where 
several actors share power as well as a strong interest in the activity…regimes 
are likely to emerge from bargains struck among small groups of key players.”71  
This is the situation encountered by the NP regime.  A small number of actors 
on the UNSC – mostly the P-5 – are the most influential in a regime that 
encompasses a large majority of the world’s nations.   
Regimes – those not imposed - form in a number of ways.  First, regimes 
form around shared interests; ideally, cooperation in the management of such 
interests yields better results than could be obtained through individual policy 
pursuit.72  If, however, a regime forms around a security issue, like non-
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proliferation, member nations assume that every other member nation shares 
the value placed upon the issue.73  Discussion of the formation and content of 
regimes must therefore look at both the convergence of the power behind the 
regime formation and the legitimate social purpose for the regime.74  In the 
case of the counter- and non-proliferation regimes, the social purpose drew the 
sources of power together.75 
 Arthur A. Stein wrote about regimes of common interests where each 
member works toward an agreed-upon ideal and regimes of common aversion 
where each member avoids an agreed-upon bad outcome.  A regime of common 
interest recognizes that working together produces a better alternative than if 
each nation merely maximizes its own self-interest.76  This is particularly true 
in the NP regime where the consequences of each actor maximizing his own 
weapons of mass destruction capability, while possibly serving as a deterrent to 
other actors, would more likely result in international instability.77  While 
successful deterrence ultimately results in non-use of weapons of mass 
destruction, reduction of stockpiles and prevention of proliferation is intuitively 
a better way to ensure non-use.     
                                                          
73 Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1983), 177. 
74 Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change…,” 248. 
75 Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change…,”250.  Ruggie uses the post-
1971 economic order as an example of non-hegemonic concurrence of social purpose. 
76 Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration:  Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in 
International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 120. 
77 However, there is a persistent argument that proliferation will actually result in stability. 
See, e.g. David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International 
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 87-119.    
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The NP regime is a regime of common interest in that the members are 
cooperating in the reduction of WMD and combating proliferation.  During the 
eight-year Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s, two nations maximized their 
destructive capability and engaged in unrestricted warfare.  There was clearly a 
common interest in foregoing the use of chemical weapons.  However, both 
nations used chemical weapons against each other’s military and civilian 
targets contributing to the destabilization of the region and ultimately the 
downfall of Saddam Hussein.  While the chemical weapons convention had not 
yet entered into effect, both nations are signatories to the Geneva Protocol 
prohibiting the first use of chemical weapons.  Had these nations adhered 
(though almost universal belief is that Iraq was the first to use), they would not 
have utilized chemical weapons.78  Neither, however, wished to relinquish any 
opportunity to annihilate the other.  In the end, for both nations, use of 
chemical weapons was the most preferred, but least optimal outcome, yet these 
nations were unable to coordinate non-use.   
Nations must collaborate in order to avoid the most preferred, but also 
least optimal outcome.  Specifically, this requires states to forgo their most 
preferred option of ever-increasing strength in terms of gaining access to and 
increasing their share of WMD.  For security regimes, nations must give up 
some of their security capability (the unrestricted power to destroy an enemy) 
in order to avoid a worldwide arms race.  Once the regime is in place and 
                                                          
78 Joost R. Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and The Gassing of Halabja 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2007), 47. 
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collaboration has occurred, nations will shy even further from independent 
action, instead complying with the regime in order to avoid the costs of 
disruption.79  The costs of disruption include increased difficulty in becoming 
part of future bi- or multi-lateral regimes.  The incentives to cheat are great; a 
regime of this type must have extensive and explicit organizational forms.80 
On the other hand, regimes of common aversion result when all actors 
desire to avoid a particular outcome rather than preferring the same outcome.  
The solution to this requires coordination, generally an easier action than 
collaboration.  Each nation continues independent decision-making only rarely 
having to change course to avoid the negative outcome.81  The deterrent 
example above illustrates a common aversion.  The bipolarity of the Cold War 
uniquely pitted two superpowers with nuclear weapons against each other.  
Neither made the wrong choice.  In this case, nuclear war did not occur despite 
(or perhaps because) each nation pursuing maximum capability.  Coordination 
of military exercises between the US and the USSR to avoid inadvertent 
escalation is an example of the requirements of common aversion.  Common 
aversion is the basis upon some elements of the space regime rest; in fact, the 
regime requires registration (a form of coordination) prior to launch in order to 
avoid the misperception of an ICBM attack.  
Information:  Sharing and Satisfaction 
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 Regimes serve to “improve the quantity and quality of the information 
available.”82  Regimes help “alleviate problems of asymmetrical information,” 
which serve to increase the uncertainty that regime members “face in 
evaluating each other’s policies.”83  In terms of facilitating cooperation and 
avoiding cheating, Keohane considered the informational functions among the 
most important aspects of a regime.84  The NP regime overcomes an 
informational deficiency inherent among relationships involving sovereign 
nations.  Monitoring and verification procedures allow powerful sovereignties to 
engage in mutually beneficial activities with an assurance that the other 
signatories are doing the same.  Without information assurances provided by a 
regime, a nation may be less willing to give up capabilities that contribute to its 
security.  
Regimes enhance future cooperation by facilitating additional 
agreements.85  Of course, this assumes that the member has cooperated within 
the regime’s issue area.  New agreements do not necessarily concern the same 
issue area of the regime.86  For both linked issues (like nuclear power and 
nuclear weapons) and unrelated issues, the regime offers a standard of 
compliance that nations can use to assess the feasibility of future agreements.  
                                                          
82 Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," 338. 
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This standard allows nations to bypass certain negotiation hurdles by relying 
on past performance.87  Tate recognized that “[s]tates that renege on their 
commitments are likely to find the costs of defection high because they forfeit 
the benefits that arise from cooperation in the ostensible issue-area, or that 
might otherwise accrue from the fact that such issues tend to be 'nested' in 
wider strategic interactions among governments.”88  This directly relates the 
concept that regimes serve to reduce transaction costs (discussed below), 
especially those associated with organizing a regime or even an agreement.89   
Since the existing regime shares some of the elements of a subsequent 
agreement, the current cooperative relationship reduces transactions costs for 
a new agreement, the establishment of a new regime, or the expansion or 
evolution of an existing regime.  Creating a regime is costly; the high cost of 
regime formation contributes to their persistence, once formed.90  Even if the 
regime is not exactly what the members want, maintaining the status quo is 
still less expensive than the costs of creating a new regime especially if the 
member’s interest in the issue-area, while shifted, is still addressed.91   
There is an assumption that members engage in a cost-benefit analysis 
when presented with an attractive alternative to compliance.  Members then 
find that compliance costs fall with increasing compliance while violation costs 
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increase the cost of future transactions.92  Arthur A. Stein advanced other 
explanations for regime continuity observing that regimes encourage members 
to cease continual cost-benefit analysis.  When members have uncertainty 
about the permanence of the interest shift, there is legitimacy borne of 
traditional (routine, see above) compliance based upon a fear of reputational 
cost for defecting.  One final point that Stein emphasized is that the regime 
may influence the member and cause a shift in the criteria utilized in cost-
benefit analysis.93   
Finally, regime compliance provides information about the regime 
member and reduces information cost to external parties. Since regimes 
facilitate the making of agreements, and positive reputational effects reduce the 
cost of subsequent transactions, the costs of bargaining for each additional 
agreement is lower.94  The international system involves many regimes and 
agreements about many differing issues.  Each cooperative incidence 
contributes to a reduced cost of a future cooperation.  Adhering to the regime 
reduces the decision-making costs inherent in an individual evaluation of each 
course of action.95  
Because many regimes require the input of non-state entities, 
international organizations also play a role in regime compliance.96  The 
                                                          
92 Young, “International Regimes…, 89. 
93 Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration…,” 138-39. 
94 Keohane, After Hegemony, 90. 
95 Keohane, After Hegemony, 110. 
96 Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 17. 
 
31 
 
members of the regime frequently rely on agencies that specialize in the subject 
matter of the regime to engage in information gathering and inspection.97  
Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell found that the regimes with the best compliance 
records work closely with capable international organizations (IGOs and 
NGOs).98  In some cases, regimes deal with implementation issues by using 
international institutional arraignments like the United Nations.99 
The least effective way to guarantee regime success is through 
compelling compliance. Attempts at persuasion are a more likely course of 
action than sanction.100  However, even though there are some serious doubts 
about the effectiveness of a sanction, punishment remains an option.101  A 
sanction requires incentive and ability.  For example, many states had to 
cooperate in order to sanction Iran for its pre-Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA) continued development of weapon-grade nuclear material.  
While most states have great incentive for such action, these nations move very 
slowly when the time comes to impose sanctions.102  For many nations – 
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especially those with a robust belief in a nation’s right to determine its own 
direction – Iran’s singular violations were not that bad.  The slow pace at which 
the international community takes meaningful action encourages other states 
to engage in behavior similar to that of Iran.  One explanation for the failure of 
members to punish violators rapidly is fear that the regime will punish their 
own future violations.103  In monetary terms, this is a safety cushion in the 
event of future hard times. 
With this broad background in regimes, the next chapter will narrow the 
focus to security regimes, the non-proliferation regime in particular, and the 
background and mandates of UNSCR 1540.  
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Three: The Nonproliferation Regime, UNSCR 1540, Traits of Successful Regimes 
Today, I ask the U.N. Security Council to adopt a new anti-
proliferation resolution. This resolution should call on all members of 
the U.N. to criminalize the proliferation of weapons -- weapons of 
mass destruction, to enact strict export controls consistent with 
international standards, and to secure any and all sensitive materials 
within their own borders. The United States stands ready to help any 
nation draft these new laws, and to assist in their enforcement. 
 
President George W. Bush 
Speech to the United Nations Security Council 
September 23, 2003 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will specifically trace the nonproliferation regime and 
discuss the impact of UNSCR 1540 on it. I will introduce the factors that 
predict nonproliferation regime compliance. 
The better-known arms control regimes include the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT) based upon recognition of parity and mutual 
vulnerability between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR).104 
This treaty froze the number of land- and submarine-based missile launchers 
and mandated that new systems could come on line only to replace dismantled 
older systems.  The successful SALT I cooperation led to SALT II, a treaty that 
provided not only a freeze on increasing the nuclear arsenal and its delivery 
                                                          
104 Condoleezza Rice, “SALT and the Search for a Security Regime,” in U.S. – Soviet Security 
Cooperation:  Achievements, Failures, Lessons, ed., Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, 
Alexander Dallin (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1988), 297. 
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systems, but also a reduction in the total number of weapons.105 Despite the 
US Senate never ratifying SALT II, the nations largely adhered to its provisions. 
The procedures in place for the SALT negotiations led to even further cuts 
under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the Strategic Offensive 
Reductions Treaty (SORT), and the recently ratified New START Treaty.  
However, arms control treaties are not the only example of a security 
regime.  Import and export controls play a role as well.  The Australia Group is 
central to the export control regime targeting chemical weapons proliferation; 
this organization tracks component elements of chemical weapons.106  Related 
to the Australia Group’s actions is the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export 
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.  The 
Wassenaar Arrangement focuses on export “transparency, data exchange and 
policy coordination,” but contains little in terms of enforcement.107   
The sections below explore the literature on regimes with the goal of 
identifying the core elements of regime success and developing hypotheses for 
research.  
UNSCR 1540 
                                                          
105 Article III (1-2).  “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union Of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Together with Agreed 
Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the Treaty,” June 18, 1979 (unratified) 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-2.html (accessed May 22, 2009). 
106 Jim A. Davis, “Over a Decade of Counterproliferation,” in Avoiding the Abyss, ed. Jim A. 
Davis and Barry R. Schneider (Westport:  Praeger Security International, 2006):  12. 
107 Ted Whiteside, “UNSCR 1540 and ‘Means of Delivery,’” in Global Non-Proliferation and 
Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540, Olivia Bosch and Peter van Ham, eds. 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 117; Brad Roberts, “Nonproliferation – 
Challenges Old and New,” in Avoiding the Abyss:  Progress, Shortfalls, and the Way Ahead in 
Combating the WMD Threat, ed. Jim A. Davis and Barry R. Schneider (Westport:  Praeger 
Security International, 2006):  76. 
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UNSCR 1540 does not replace the traditional forums and processes 
for negotiating arms control and non-proliferation treaties.  Instead it 
is a mechanism that supplements these traditional forums.  It 
reinforces the norms, obligations, and legal requirements of the three 
main WMD treaties…as well as requires enforcement, which is not 
yet prevalent, much less universal in the treaty regimes. 
 
Peter van Ham and Olivia Bosch 
Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-
Terrorism: the Role of Resolution 
UNSCR 1540 and Its Implications 
 
Before looking at UNSCR 1540 specifically, an analysis of the NP regime 
is in order.  First, it is critical to lay out an understanding of the NP Regime 
and its driving principle: that WMD present a threat to mankind and nations 
must cooperate to eliminate this threat.  The normative presumption is that 
WMD proliferation is bad.108 
The NP regime is an aggregate of treaties covering many different 
subjects.  The large elements of the NP regime are the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention 
(BTWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  While ratification of 
the NPT occurred during 1970 making it the oldest of these three treaties, 
chemical weapons conventions have a long history based on the prohibitions 
against first use enacted following the First World War.109  That said, none of 
                                                          
108 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Diplomacy of Nuclear Proliferation,” in Negotiating World Order:  
The Artisanship and Architecture of Global Diplomacy, ed., Alan K. Hendrickson (Wilmington: 
Scholarly Resources, 1986), 84. 
109 “Protocol for the Prohibition of the use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” June 17, 1925, 26 United States Treaties 571. 
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these agreements includes specific measures against non-state actors, one of 
the driving forces behind UNSCR 1540; and most of the provisions of these 
agreements directly relate to non-proliferation between states.110   However, 
each begins to recognize – though not as explicitly as UNSCR 1540 – the 
possibility of other actors, non-state actors, obtaining WMD.  These agreements 
prohibit transfers or WMD to “any recipient,” “anyone,” “any natural or legal 
person,” or “international organizations.”111  Of these, only the CWC contains 
language that obligates members to enact domestic legislation.112 
Obviously, the rules, procedures, and obligations vary among these 
treaties.  The fact that membership in each treaty is not universal complicates 
this variance.  Thus, almost universal membership yet divergent obligations 
and expectations characterize the NP regime. 
While the jurisdiction of UNSCR 1540 includes every UN member nation, 
its application must account for the different commitments of each nation; 
                                                          
110 “The Security Council, …Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-
state actors…may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
and their means of delivery” (emphasis in original), UNSCR 1540.   
111 NPT Article I; CWC Article I 1.(a); BTWC Article III. 
112 CWC Article VII 1.(a-c) provides:   
Each State Part shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary 
measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.  In particular it shall: 
(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place 
under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation 
with respect to such activity; 
(b) Not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a State Party 
under this Convention; and 
(c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity prohibited 
to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by natural persons, 
possessing its nationality, in conformity with international law (emphasis added). 
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every nation is a party to some part of the NP regime.  UNSCR 1540 does not 
abrogate the essential sovereign right to ratify and comply with a specific 
agreement that is part of the NP regime.  For example, the UN does not hold 
non-signatories to the CWC to the standards of this particular treaty.  UNSCR 
1540 solves the sub-optimal enforcement and cooperation caused by piecemeal 
membership.   
Cooperation among nations is necessary for the NP regime to operate 
effectively.  Cooperation in the field of intelligence sharing combined with 
mutual support among nations is required to optimize the benefits of the NP 
regime.  Larger and wealthier nations must shoulder a greater burden for law 
enforcement including the provision of resources to developing nations.  Each 
nation must put forth an equitable – as opposed to equal – effort based upon 
the threats faced. 
The NP regime seeks to halt the spread of WMD by both states and non-
state actors.  If the NP regime worked perfectly, nations would reduce WMD 
stocks, cease the export of WMD and WMD-producing technology, deny access 
to WMD to non-state actors, and prosecute under local law non-state actors 
who obtain or seek to obtain WMD. 
There is really no greater illustration of the destruction capable by non-
state actors than that of 11 September 2001.  These events, however, 
presented the world with a relatively benign threat.  In reality, each of the four 
hijacked airliners represented a conventional cruise missile in the hands of a 
non-state actor.  The catalyst behind UNSCR 1540 is the threat posed by non-
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state actors in possession of WMD.  A seam in the NP efforts emerges since 
international laws can regulate only state behavior without regard for 
individual and group activity.113  Filling this seam is necessary in order to stop 
the spread of WMD to non-state actors.114 
UNSCR 1540 calls upon member nations to establish and enforce 
domestic legislation to counter the proliferation of WMD to non-state actors.  
This is a unique encroachment of state sovereignty in that, rather than relying 
upon the process by which a state accedes to a treaty and implements the 
treaty’s provisions, the state’s membership in the UN compels the state to 
adopt the provisions.  The relevant portions follow: 
2.  …all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall 
adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any 
non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, 
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons 
and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as 
well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities 
participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them.  
 
*** 
 
3.  …all States shall take and enforce effective measures to 
establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, 
including by establishing appropriate controls over related 
materials and to this end shall: 
 
*** 
 
                                                          
113 Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law in a World of Liberal States," European Journal of 
International Law 6 (1995):  504.   
114 UNSCR1540 provides the following recognition:  “The Security Council, …Recognizing that 
most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to which they are 
parties…Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures 
to prevent the proliferations of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of 
delivery.” 
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(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and 
law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat…the 
illicit trafficking and brokering in such items… 
 
(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective 
national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, 
including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, 
transit, trans-shipment, and re-export and controls on providing 
funds and services relating to such export and trans-shipment 
such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to 
proliferation…115 
 
The UNSC adopted UNSCR 1540 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
entitled Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and 
Acts of Aggression. Chapter VII is that part of the UN Charter that authorizes 
the use of force to settle disputes. Practically speaking, however, substantive 
sanctions are the usual first substantive step following noncompliance.  For 
comparative purposes, Chapter VI of the UN Charter is the more commonly 
invoked; Chapter VI calls for pacific resolution of disputes and does not contain 
authority for the use of force or sanctions.  Thus, Chapter VII authority is the 
more powerful and a bold step for the UN. UNSCR 1540 was only the second 
time that the UNSC used this authority for a functional threat (as opposed to a 
state-specific threat); the previous time was the UNSCR 1373, a post-9/11 
counter-terrorism measure.116   
                                                          
115 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004), 28 April 2004.   http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/9871498.html (accessed May 10, 2009).   
116 Peter van Ham and Olivia Bosch, “Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: the Role 
of Resolution UNSCR 1540 and Its Implications,” in Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-
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Using Chapter VII was a source of conflict in the enabling debates; some 
nations voiced alarm that compliance through coercion was now a 
possibility.117  Pakistan objected to Chapter VII because it felt that action by 
non-state actors was not imminent (ironic – or clever - given the activities of A. 
Q. Khan).  Switzerland, Indonesia, Nigeria, and India sought assurances that 
authorization under Chapter VII did not indicate pre-approval for enforcement 
actions.  Brazil, Algeria, Malaysia, and Jordan did not think that Chapter VII 
authority was necessary because resolutions of the UNSC are binding on all 
member nations.  The US, Spain, France, Chile, New Zealand, Japan, and 
Mexico put forth the following arguments:  Chapter VII is the foundation for 
subsequent actions and the invocation of Chapter VII authority in the 
resolutions sends a serious political signal to the members of the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA).118    
Using UNSCR 1540 as a framework for measuring regime compliance 
allows for clear definition of outcomes and, more importantly for this project, 
provides a better measurement of regime success.  In addition to requiring 
adoption of domestic enabling legislation, UNSCR 1540 contains reporting 
requirements and recognition of the norms contained in the Non-Proliferation 
                                                          
117 Peter van Ham and Olivia Bosch, “Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: the Role 
of Resolution UNSCR 1540 and Its Implications,” in Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-
Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540, Olivia Bosch and Peter van Ham, eds. (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 7. 
118 United Nations Security Council, “Speakers in Security Council Debate on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Express Doubts over Content of Proposed Non-proliferation Text,” Press Release 
SC/8070Security Council 4950th Meeting, April 22, 2004, at 
www.un.org/news/press/docs/2004/sc8070.doc.htm (accessed May 24, 2009).   
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Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention: 
4.  …calls upon States to present a first report no later than six 
months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on 
steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this 
resolution. 
*** 
8.  Calls upon all States 
 
(b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet 
been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under 
the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties (emphasis in 
original).119 
 
What are the practical expectations of UNSCR 1540?  First, each nation 
has reporting requirements; nations will report, fail to report, or fail to report 
with a reason.120  Second, under UNSCR 1540 nations must adopt enabling 
legislation or report on its pre-existence; however, they may simply do nothing.  
Finally, nations must enforce the legislation.  As before, this may not happen.  
None of the steps presupposes the others; a nation with pre-existing legislation 
may fail to report and yet enforce anyway. 
This dissertation will look at both compliance and implementation of 
UNSCR 1540.  As mentioned above, the goal of UNSCR is stopping WMD 
proliferation to non-state actors.  Enforcement is the key measure of success 
for the regime. However, enforcement is not easily measured.  Therefore, the 
main assumption of this dissertation, and I argue the drafters of UNSCR 1540 
                                                          
119 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004), April 28, 2004, http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/9871498.html (accessed May 10, 2009).   
120 “[C]alls upon states to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of 
this resolution to the Committee on steps they gave taken or intend to take to implement this 
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as well, is that compliance with UNSCR 1540’s provisions and implementation 
of its mandates is the mechanism that ultimately leads to regime success. 
Reasons Regimes Succeed: 
 Many things contribute to the success of regimes.  Ideally, mere 
membership and nothing more indicates a willingness and commitment to 
comply.  If idealism fails, characteristics of the regime and its members 
increase the chance of regime success.  These characteristics include respect 
for the rule of law, international and regional compliance, and reputation.  This 
section begins with background on definitions of regime success and follows 
with a description of the characteristics and predictors of successful regimes. 
Compliance with the regime is often the definition of success; 
furthermore, compliance is also the measure the strength of a regime.  
Strength takes on additional importance when members must chose 
compliance over a short-term benefit.121  Volker Rittberger added two 
additional measures of regime success:  effectiveness and durability.  Taken 
together, these indicate compliance with norms and rules (effectiveness) in a 
routine manner (durability).122    
The origin of a regime’s authority helps determine the strength or 
weakness of the regime.123  Authority has two elements, power and legitimacy.  
                                                          
121 Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International 
Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 496. 
122 Volker Rittberger, “Editor’s Introduction,” in International Regimes in East-West Politics, ed. 
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(Cambridge:  The MIT Press, 1999), 247. 
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Members tend to follow the prescriptions and proscriptions of a strong regime.  
A regime that ties compliance to something more than the current power of a 
hegemon remains strong.  Thus, a regime enforced by a declining hegemon is 
likely to falter if only the enforcement power of the hegemon defines success 
(though, as discussed below, a regime, unlike a hegemon, can recover).   
Legitimacy of social purpose, however, also contributes to a regime’s 
authority and potential for success.  When members view regimes as “good,” 
the regime achieves additional authority.  This authority will even substitute 
for the authority of the hegemon responsible for the creation of the regime.124 
Regime legitimacy is among the crucial factors determining whether a 
nation adheres to the regime.125  In the international system, compelling 
compliance is frequently not an option therefore; states comply because they 
want to.  Legitimacy is first a function of the process by which the founders 
promulgated the rules of the regime.126  Contributing to regime legitimacy is 
the pedigree of the regime, a measure of the founders of the regime and the 
enforcement procedures emplaced.  If the regime requires an agent to enforce 
it, the process by which founders create and staff the agency contributes to the 
regime’s pedigree. 
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Second, a highly legitimate regime must remain consistent with generally 
accepted norms.127  Since the NP regime’s normative presumption is that 
proliferation of WMD is bad, the obligations pursuant to UNSCR 1540 in 
support of non-proliferation are consistent.  UNSCR 1540 gains legitimacy 
because of the historical acceptance of the NP norms.128  Thus, if UNSCR 1540 
were the first NP initiative, rather than the latest of many going as far back as 
the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, it could 
suffer from a lack of legitimacy.  The norms against WMD proliferation have 
grown and solidified since this early prohibition. 
Third, legitimacy also encompasses two additional related concepts:  
fairness and specificity.  A regime’s obligations must be fair; that is they must 
apply to all equally.  (Fairness is also part of the rule of law concept discussed 
below.)  In the case of UNSCR 1540, all nations are subject to the obligations.  
A piecemeal application of UNSCR 1540 – for example to developing states only, 
or to all states except the P-5 – detracts from fairness.  One of the strengths of 
UNSCR 1540 is its universal application.  Universality of UNSC resolutions is 
rare; usually the UNSC directs resolutions at a single state or in response to a 
specific incident.   
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Specificity refers to clarity.  If the mandate is unclear, a nation could fail 
to adhere and/or implement.   An unclear mandate is, moreover, extremely 
difficult to enforce. 129  Specificity links legitimacy to reputation.  UNSCR 1540 
is very specific; its provisions contain obligations to “adopt and enforce effective 
laws,” as well as “develop and maintain appropriate” measures to account for 
and secure “production, use, storage or transport,” measures for “physical 
protection,” and “border controls.”  In addition, UNSCR 1540 calls on nations 
to ‘establish, develop, review and maintain export and trans-shipment 
controls,” “end user controls,” “appropriate criminal and civil penalties,” 
present reports on steps taken, and “adopt national rules and regulations…to 
ensure compliance under the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties.”  There 
is little room to question the clarity of obligations under UNSCR 1540. 
Members also adhere to regimes because ignoring the obligations 
embodied in the principles and norms damages the member’s reputation.130  
Simmons observed that reputation was a factor in predicting compliance with 
monetary regimes, especially among regional states.131  Reputation takes time 
to build, but is easily destroyed.132  Nations avoid becoming a bad example 
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because of reputation.  “To a government that values its ability to make future 
agreements, reputation is a crucial resource.”133 
Reputation, and its effect on future transactions, is among the reasons 
that states comply even when it is in their narrow self-interest to violate in a 
particular situation.134  Some nations consider regimes that encompass treaty 
obligations stronger because of the damaging reputational effects of abrogating 
a treaty.135  However, “[c]ountries that score low with respect to the rule of law 
do not have much to lose by noncompliance.”136   
Reputation is not nearly as clear-cut as the previous discussion implies.  
Reputation could even cause non-compliance when actions, in support of other 
areas where reputation is important, conflict with regime compliance.  As 
Keohane pointed out, “it may be desirable to have a reputation not only for 
keeping agreements but for vigorously pursuing one’s interests, helping one’s 
friends, and punishing one’s enemies.”137  For regimes then, the measure of 
reputation must relate directly to the issue-area of the regime.138  For example, 
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the international community views Australia, first host of the Australia Group, 
as a nation completely devoted to adherence to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.  Were Australia to suddenly purchase or commence manufacture 
of chemical weapons, it would suffer severe reputational damage. 
A nation’s perception of its place in the international system is integral to 
considerations of reputation.  For NP to succeed, a nation must value the 
reputation as a non-proliferator more than any benefit it could gain from other 
options, otherwise it may either develop or proliferate nuclear weapons. 
Why do I mention reputation?  Valuing reputation is among the 
qualitative factors that lead to regime success.  Nations build reputation upon 
the continuing nature of the cooperation necessary for NP regime success.  For 
a nation to value reputation for regime compliance, the regime must meet three 
criteria:  first, noncompliance must be readily apparent; second, those who 
know about the noncompliance must be important to the non-complying party; 
finally, the costs of noncompliance must exceed the current gain.139  UNSCR 
1540 provides the open forum for identifying and imposing costs on those 
members who fail to comply.   
Compliance and noncompliance are crucial to reputation.  Consequently, 
members may seek to mask noncompliance behind ambiguities among the 
regime’s obligations.  This serves not only the direct effect of avoiding 
immediate compliance, but also the indirect effect of distinguishing the current 
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noncompliance from consideration in other arenas.140  In this use, compliance 
or noncompliance with a legitimate obligation affects a nation’s reputation as a 
reliable partner in future cooperative effort.  Compliance sometimes clashes 
with interest maximizing behavior.  Specificity in regime obligations forces 
nations to choose between current opportunity and reputation by forestalling 
any claims of noncompliance due to unclear obligations. 
Regime Effectiveness: 
Ideally, in addition to defined principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures, a regime must be effective, for this is how the international 
community evaluates regime success.  Effectiveness is more than statements of 
compliance with a regime; it measures whether or not the regime members 
adhere to the principles and norms upon which the founders created the 
regime.141  Jacobson and Brown Weiss - when evaluating international 
environmental accords - defined compliance as a function of adherence “to the 
provisions of the accord and to the implementing measures that [states] have 
instituted.”142  For these researchers there were two parts to compliance:  
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Specific compliance with procedural and substantive obligations and 
compliance with the spirit of the treaty.143   
For the NP regime, the founding principle is that weapons of mass 
destruction are inherently bad.  This includes development as well as 
possession and use.  Initially this meant chemical and biological agents.  While 
the development and proliferation of such agents was slowing – primarily 
because of World War I experiences - nations developed even worse 
alternatives, namely nuclear weapons.  Thus, while the NP regime had some 
effect in reducing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, its 
principles did not translate to stopping the development of nuclear weapons.  
The regime needed to evolve and expand to include this new threat.  If 
effectiveness includes both achieving the stated objectives of the regime and 
addressing the problems of the regime, then the spirit of nonproliferation 
includes the cessation of a nation’s chemical, biological, and nuclear 
development and manufacture as well as the development of similar 
alternatives.144  Nonproliferation also includes the cessation of manufacture for 
sovereign use as well.  The NP regime has stopped neither WMD manufacturing 
by nation-states nor non-state actors desiring such capabilities.   
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Another view of effectiveness is that provided by Oona Hathaway.  In her 
study of international human rights treaties, Hathaway defined effectiveness as 
evidence that a nation changed its practices in response to ratifying the 
treaty.145  Hathaway’s definition, however, is difficult to measure because it 
cannot account for those instances when a nation engages in compliant 
behavior for other reasons.  Nor can it account for a nation’s constraint.  I 
argue that a regime is effective if it prevents further proliferation.  The regime is 
effective if a nation forgoes an opportunity to commence or expand a WMD 
program. Clearly, the NP regime is effective if it prevents further or even 
reverses proliferation. Practically, however, it is impossible to measure negative 
behavior. 
 The integration of the regime’s principles and norms into state behavior 
is the essence of a regime’s effectiveness.  Cooperation is one indicator that this 
integration has occurred.  Robert Keohane stated, “Intergovernmental 
cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government 
are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as 
the result of a process of policy coordination.”146  Cooperation may involve a 
nation taking a route different (though not necessarily contrary) to its preferred 
course of action.  Keohane gathered the concepts of principles, norms, rules, 
                                                          
145 Oona A. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law Journal 111, 
no. 8 (June 2002), 1965. 
146 “[A]ttainment of the gains from pursuing complementary policies depends on cooperation.” 
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
2005 ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 51-52, 54. 
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and decision-making procedures together and determined what injunctions the 
regime prescribes.  In this way, he measures a regime’s effectiveness in terms 
of specific and identifiable violations of injunctions, ultimately concluding that 
these are the “essence of international regimes.”147  
One of the problems encountered in evaluating regime compliance is the 
distinction between monitoring and verification.  As Smith observed, 
“monitoring – the collection of data” is “rather objective and technical.”148  
Verification, on the other hand, includes a subjective process concerned with 
“doctrine, intent, significance, language, and…domestic considerations.”149  
Verification uses information gained from monitoring in order to make a 
judgment about a member’s compliance with the regime’s tenets.  Two good 
examples of this come from the former and ongoing efforts to curb Iranian and 
North Korean nuclear development programs, respectfully.  Each nation claims 
that it has the right to develop “peaceful” nuclear reactors.150  Some of that 
technology, however, easily transfers to weapons technology.  The international 
community must verify at what point the program crosses the line from 
peaceful use to weapon development; monitoring alone would not be sufficient 
                                                          
147 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
2005 ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 59. 
148 Roger K. Smith, “Institutionalization as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 230. 
149 Roger K. Smith, “Institutionalization as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 230. 
150 Both of these nations make their “peaceful use” claim by invoking Article IV of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty.  This article states, “[n]othing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as 
affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production 
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…” “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons,” July 1, 1968, 21 United States Treaties and Other International Agreements 483. 
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to task. The recent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) involving Iran 
contains an agreement to limit uranium enrichment and allow intense 
monitoring and verification in exchange for the lifting of sanctions against Iran. 
This dissertation uses compliance as the dependent variable against 
which I will test the hypotheses.  The hypotheses will explore those factors that 
predict compliance.  Compliance with the regime is often the definition of 
success; furthermore, compliance is also the measure the strength of a regime.  
In the case of this dissertation, compliance is enactment of domestic 
legislation.     
Roger K. Smith utilized the term institutionalization when he described 
the characteristics of a successful regime.  Smith borrowed the term and its 
components from Samuel P. Huntington’s matrix for evaluating the stability of 
domestic regimes.  Smith specifically adapted the matrix to analyze the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime arguing that mere compliance was insufficient to 
measure success.151   I adopt this analysis and broaden it for use in the NP 
regime in an effort to fully capture regime success beyond that which the 
quantitative analysis reveals.  If, as I predict, the enactment of domestic 
legislation yields increased compliance, high levels of institutionalization lend 
qualitative support to the quantitative indicia of regime success. 
                                                          
151 Roger K. Smith, “Institutionalization as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights,” Millennium: 
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more nuanced look at non-proliferation regimes when he discusses the “bomb in the 
basement.”  If every nation has a secret nuclear weapons program but no one detonates a 
bomb, is nuclear non-proliferation working? Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Diplomacy of Nuclear 
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A regime displays high levels of institutionalization when members 
adhere to its norms, rather than simply follow its rules and procedures.152   
The concept of institutionalization is different from that of compliance.  Recall 
that compliance is a measure of state action in accordance with rules and 
procedures; institutionalization is compliance that references rules and 
procedures for form, not for obligation.  While institutionalization itself is 
actually a characteristic of the member nation, it is the structure of the regime 
that provides the blocks upon which institutionalization is built.   
Practical Context 
Lending insight to the model developed below is both the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT) and UNSCR 1540.  The CAT requires member nations to 
enact domestic legislation against torture.  UNSCR 1540 makes domestic 
legislation in the NP regime mandatory.  I argue that both the drafters of the 
CAT and the drafters of UNSCR 1540 realized that member nations need to 
take additional action for these regimes to succeed.  Thus, accession to a 
regime is more than ratification of an agreement. 
The NP regime is also ineffective if nations combat proliferation using 
different standards.  Without the baseline of domestic legislation, one nation 
may arrest non-state actors as they attempt to cross the border with WMD 
while another state may simply turn them away. The heart of UNSCR 1540 is 
                                                          
152 Roger K. Smith, “Institutionalization as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 229. 
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compliance with the obligation to enact domestic legislation.  This obligation 
fills a gap in the NP regime into which non-state actors currently fall.   
The domestic legislation obligation of UNSCR 1540 also provides both a 
basis against which the domestic polity judges its leaders’ actions and upon 
which leaders may justify their actions.  Even if a leader intended to violate 
domestic law, the fact that such violation would embolden the opposition (if 
any) may give him or her pause.153   
The test for regime success is compliance by those states that would not 
have selected to accede to a voluntary version of UNSCR 1540.  Downs, Rocke, 
and Barsoom examined international agreements and argued that compliance 
is not a problem because of self-selection.  A state will not join an agreement 
that it is not inclined to follow.154  With this in mind, the obligations of UNSCR 
1540 are minimal for states that already have enacted appropriate domestic 
legislation; these states are akin to those that self-select.   
Example, Routine, and Proximity 
The concept of good example harnesses the beneficial impact of 
encouraging others to take the same actions that you take.  Cooperation in a 
regime provides a common benefit that transcends issues of power or rivalry 
                                                          
153 Andrew Hurrell, “International Society and the Study of Regimes:  A Reflective Approach,” in 
Regime Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1993):  71. 
154 George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom, "Is the Good News About Compliance 
Good News About Cooperation?" International Organization 50, no. 3 (1996): 380.  Selection 
effect is lost on those who ratify the CAT.  See, Emilia Justyna Powell, and Jeffrey K. Staton, 
“Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation,” International Studies 
Quarterly 53, no. 1 (March 2009):  149-174. 
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and in some cases (like the NP regime) can contribute to state security.155  The 
fact that other states are complying with the regime enhances continued 
regime compliance.156   
In bad example, nations fear to violate the regime because it may 
promote others to do the same, especially when regime violations are not that 
severely punished.157  A regime like the NP regime that requires surveillance or 
allows sanction (or both) requires an explicit enforcement organization.158 
The issue of Iranian nuclear proliferation provides an interesting 
example.  Until recently, this nation flouted the international community’s 
demands to open access to its nuclear program.  The IAEA continually found 
the Iranians in violation of its proscriptions on weapons development and 
international monitoring and the international community continued to 
sanction Iran.  For Iran, however, it seems self-interested defiance of the 
nonproliferation regime was without penalty.  Iran may have exhibited bad 
example behavior because for many years, the international community failed 
to sanction meaningfully and the sanctions that they did impose took a long 
                                                          
155 “Cooperation could be sustained by the prospect of mutual benefit, apart from superpower 
rivalry.”  Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy, 2005 ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), xi. 
156 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
2005 ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 89. 
157 See generally, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy, 2005 ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 105.  The “Fairness 
Model” outlined by Oona Hathaway provides another viewpoint on the Iranian issue.  In this 
model, compliance is a function of legitimacy and justice.  Thus, for Iran, prohibitions on 
nuclear development are not legitimate in that other nations do not permit Iran to have the 
advantages that some enjoy.  It is not fair.  Oona A. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties 
Make a Difference?” Yale Law Journal 111, no. 8 (June 2002), 1958-59. 
158 Oran R. Young, “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” World Politics 32 
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time to show results.  This bad behavior encourages others to defy proliferation 
tenets as well.  
The failure to sanction meaningfully is another point altogether.  Many 
nations fail to sanction because they fear the penalties of their own future 
transgressions.  Thus, when their turn comes they can rely on support from 
the current non-compliant nation.    
This chapter traced the nonproliferation regime and its impact on 
UNSCR 1540 as well as its role within the regime. With the background in 
measures of regime compliance as well as factors contributing to compliance, 
this dissertation transitions to operationalizing compliance in a testable way. 
The next chapter builds upon this one and tests predictors of regime success 
against a recent dataset. I will introduce a model to assess regime success and 
to allow analysts to predict more accurately the potential for success. 
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Four: Introducing the Variables and Conducting Analysis 
 
This institution was founded because men and women who came 
before us had the foresight to know that our nations are more secure 
when we uphold basic laws and basic norms, and pursue a path of 
cooperation over conflict. 
 
President Barack Obama 
Remarks to the UNGA, September 28, 2015 
  
Testing the Non-proliferation Regime  
While a number of international agreements comprise this regime, I focus 
on examining one in particular: United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540. This resolution is a rare mandate enforceable through the collective 
security authority found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.159 It also contains 
specific provisions mandating implementation in a way that should make their 
efforts easier to observe. The resolution applies to all states, and targets 
potential sub-national actors (e.g. terrorist groups) who may seek to acquire 
WMD. Consequently, it serves as a good case for examining the relationship 
between international legal responsibilities and domestic enforcement efforts.  
I conduct this analysis using novel quantitative data on regime 
implementation and compliance. Results reveal a significant link between the 
nature of states’ domestic politics, and the breadth and depth of their 
commitments to an important non-proliferation effort. The implications for 
policy are clear: actors who seek to control the spread of WMD must be mindful 
                                                          
159 Samantha Pitts-Kiefer and Page Southland, NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index: Building a 
Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action, Second Edition (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
2014), http://ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2014-NTI-Index-Report.pdf 
(accessed December 4, 2015). 
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of the domestic context. They must make national enforcement part of the 
regime or the regime will not be effective. Before I begin the analysis of 
Resolution 1540, however, I examine security regimes more generally in order 
to highlight the benefits and challenges associated with these agreements.  
Hypotheses 
The literature strongly suggests that the nature of the domestic 
constituency, if supportive of the regime, contributes to increased compliance. 
In a review of international regime theory, Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons 
argued, “foreign policy is integrally related to domestic structures and 
processes.”160 These same structures control the ability of the state to sustain 
compliance to regimes to which it has committed.161 A later quantitative study 
by Simmons using compliance with the International Monetary Fund’s 
standards and obligations, found that nations with rule of law-based principles 
were more likely to comply with the commitments inherent in regime 
membership.162 In this study, domestic respect for laws translated to 
international respect for laws and fulfillment of regime requirements because 
nations would avoid damaging a reputation for respect of laws.163  
                                                          
160 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International 
Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 499. 
161 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 516. 
162 Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior:  Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000):  
832.   
163 Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior,” 820.   
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Another domestic factor contributing to regime compliance is the 
translation of the regime obligations into domestic legislation.164  The fact that 
domestic courts sometimes enforce regimes directly relates to domestic 
legislation.165  Such enforcement is a function of the governmental system of 
the regime member.  In other words, when more domestic actors weigh in on a 
regime, there is a better chance that a member will follow the regime’s tenets.  
In the US, domestic laws require a majority of the Congress as well as 
presidential input.  The domestic discourse involves, at a minimum, 536 people 
not to mention the other two sides of the policy triangle:  the bureaucracy and 
interest groups.   
This level of lawmaker engagement and domestic buy-in prior to 
enactment is a sound predictor of compliance and potential regime success.  
 A similar analysis is applicable to the treaty itself irrespective of domestic 
legislation.  A democracy like the US considers a treaty as part of the law of the 
land.166  In the US, treaties require presidential signature and senate 
ratification.  Measures of compliance so heavily tied to domestic processes 
challenge the realist assumption of unitary self-interest and the assertion that 
regime compliance at a given time is more than a reflection of a current cost-
                                                          
164 Harald Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The 
Case of Security Regimes,” in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed., Volker Rittberger 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993), 385. 
165 Oran R. Young, “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” World Politics 32 
(April 1980):  333; see also n. 5, p. 333, citing, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International 
Legal Order (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964). 
166 US Constitution, Article IV; Harald Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and 
Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes,” in Regime Theory and International 
Relations, ed., Volker Rittberger (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993), 386. 
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benefit analysis in the international context.  Ratification of a treaty involves 
domestic discourse among the members of the senate.  As with domestic 
legislation, lawmaker endorsement predicts compliance. 
 For some nations, regime success under the heading of domestic 
elements is also a function of the adversarial political process.  Regime 
membership alone exerts a tremendous pressure to comply.167   When a 
government seeks to refute a treaty or a regime – particularly one that has 
strong domestic and/or international support – the opposition latches on to the 
treaty as a basis for comparison.  As Hurrell observed, “[I]t is often the violation 
of specific international norms and laws that provides the focal point around 
which domestic opposition is able to mobilize.”168  For example, when the Bush 
Administration announced in December 2001 that the US would withdraw 
from the ABM Treaty, its political opposition moved to coalesce around treaty 
obligations.  The opposition demanded to know both the purpose of the 
withdrawal and the proposed replacement to fill the perceived security gap. 
The major difference of the NP regime after the enactment of UNSCR 
1540, and the obligation that adds the most to the success of the NP regime, is 
the requirement for the enactment of domestic legislation.  There are, however, 
other predictors of regime success.  This section builds upon the framework of 
successful regime characteristics outlined in the last section.  Before 
                                                          
167 Harald Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The 
Case of Security Regimes,” in Regime Theory and International Relations, ed., Volker Rittberger 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993), 383. 
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addressing domestic legislation, I discuss rule of law and proportional 
compliance.  For each I provide identifiable and measurable indicators. 
An independent judiciary - one that checks political power – is the 
cornerstone of a rule of law state.  In a rule of law-based society, the judiciary 
is independent from the other branches of government.  The judges are free to 
apply the law without input from those members of the state that make the law 
or those members that enforce the law.  The judiciary provides a stabilizing 
influence in that it adjudicates cases brought before it in the same manner 
every time; everyone has equal access to the courts and the courts treat 
everyone alike. 169  Other branches of government must follow and enforce the 
decisions of the highest courts.  
Below, I will introduce a rule of law measure.  Nations that embrace rule 
of law-based principles are more likely to comply with the commitments 
included as part of regime membership.170  Rule of law refers to the structure 
of the judicial system that enables judicial independence with respect to 
separation from other government branches.  A government “that provides a 
stable framework of law and system of property rights domestically” is 
considered rule of law-based.171   
                                                          
169 Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law in a World of Liberal States," European Journal of 
International Law 6 (1995):  511, fn. 18, 524.   
170 Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior:  Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000):  
832.   
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International Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000):  
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Researchers have tested a number of different measures for rule of law.  
Both Simmons, and Powell and Staton, used the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) a privately developed economics-based measure of rule of law 
based upon the respect for which nations have for property rights.  This 
measure tests the ability of a non-native investor to gain satisfaction in the 
local courts when wronged in contract or other property disputes.172 Employing 
the ICRG, Simmons noted high scores in rule of law “indicate such institutional 
characteristics as a strong court system, sound political institutions, and 
provisions for orderly succession.  Low scores reflect extralegal activities in 
response to conflict and to settle disputes.”173   
Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson studied the relationship between 
contract enforceability and national economic performance. They defined CIM 
as “the ratio of non-currency money to the total money supply.”174 The CIM 
measure illustrates the trust that a nation places in the judiciary to enforce 
property rights such as those envisioned in a contract.175  
                                                          
172 Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior:  Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000):  
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In a study of human rights treaty compliance, Powell and Staton use a 
Contract Intensive Money (CIM) measure as well as three measures developed 
from the US State Department’s (DoS) annual human rights reports. Higher 
numbers represent a greater trust from “citizens, domestic and international 
businesses and banks,” in the governmental system to enforce banking 
obligations.176 Hard currency is less necessary for investment protection in 
states with a high CIM score. This measure directly relates to the Powell and 
Staton study that bound norm compliance rule of law state containing a 
judiciary that strongly enforced property rights.177  
Emilia Justyna Powell and Jeffrey Staton used the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT) as a lens through which they studied compliance with the human rights 
regime.178 They made a rule of law assumption that “states that possess 
judicial institutions that protect property rights are likely to have judicial 
institutions that protect rights generally.”179 Their findings also support the 
premise that once a state commits to an international agreement, respect for 
rule of law, evidenced by a judicial system with independence and 
enforceability to protect property rights, will increase the chances the state will 
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comply with that agreement.180 Studies of the CAT are particularly relevant to 
studies of UNSCR 1540 because Article 2 of the CAT states, “Each State Party 
shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences within its criminal law…Each 
State shall make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take 
into account their grave nature.”181  The UNSCR 1540 language closely 
resembles these actual words, but more importantly duplicates them in intent.  
Unlike UNSCR 1540, however, compliance under the CAT is mandatory only for 
nations that accede to the treaty.  Powell and Staton assumed that accession 
yields compliance with the domestic legislation provision of the CAT.182   
UNSCR 1540 is a piece of the NP regime. This chapter analyzes the 
assumption that domestic legislation will prove effective in NP efforts as 
member nations institutionalize its tenets. Respect for the rule of law is critical 
for the success of the NP regime. I predict that nations that exhibit a strong 
commitment to the rule of law will have increased compliance with both the NP 
regime and implementation of UNSCR 1540.  
H1a:  Countries that value the rule of law – strong court system, 
sound political institutions, plans for orderly succession, stable 
contract enforcement, and independent judiciaries - will exhibit 
increased compliance with the NP Regime. 
 
H1b: Countries that value the rule of law – strong court system, 
sound political institutions, plans for orderly succession, stable 
contract enforcement, and independent judiciaries - will exhibit 
increased implementation with UNSCR 1540. 
 
                                                          
180 Emilia Justyna Powell, and Jeffrey K Staton, “Domestic Judicial Institutions,” 167. 
181 CAT Article 4 section 1, 2. 
182 Emilia Justyna Powell, and Jeffrey K. Staton, “Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human 
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Nations that are members of a regime share agreement on the principles 
and norms of the regime. The existence of many agreements, supporting 
nonproliferation as well as UNSCR 1540, indicates the existence of an 
international norm that disfavors proliferation of WMD.183 Yet, the regime does 
not exhibit a universal commitment to counter- and non-proliferation. 
Enforcement is nonexistent in some states and uneven in others, especially in 
comparison to other nations. Within this chapter, I argue that increasing 
scores on Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Materials Security Index (NTI 
Index) is a good proxy for institutionalization. I work to validate the idea that 
increased institutionalization helps predict regime success.  
The hypotheses distinguish between compliance and implementation. 
Compliance with the principles and norms of a regime and institutionalizing 
the regime’s tenets is possible without formally becoming a signatory to a 
regime. The opposite is also true; a nation can exhibit full implementation of 
the regime’s rules and procedures without compliance with the principles and 
norms. These hypotheses, therefore, attempt to capture more comprehensively 
predictors of a nation’s intent and actions.  
Testing Compliance 
Based upon the previously discussed characteristics of successful 
regimes, I identified quantitative and qualitative predictors of NP Regime 
compliance, The dependent variable highlights the implementation of UNSCR 
1540: increased barriers to proliferation due to an obligation for states to enact 
                                                          
183 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony, 58.   
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domestic legislation to counter proliferation of WMD to non-state actors.  This 
study uses regression analysis to identify the factors that predict changes in 
compliance with NP norms across the domain of states in the international 
system. I use the NTI Index as a proxy for a nation’s compliance with the NP 
regime. Compliance encompasses the measures that states take to ensure 
effectiveness of international accords in domestic law.184 Increasing compliance 
levels is evidence of institutionalization of the principles and norms of the NP 
regime.185 The NTI Index separates 176 nations into two categories: 25 states 
with one kilogram or more of weapons grade nuclear materials and 151 states 
with less than one kilogram. For the 25 states with one kilogram of weapons 
grade nuclear material or more, the NTI Index assesses the following: (1) 
Quantities and Sites, (2) Security and Control Measures, (3) Global Norms, (4) 
Domestic Commitments and Capacity, and (5) Risk Environment. For the 151 
nations without the threshold level of nuclear material, the NTI Index only 
measures the last three categories. This is a qualitative score (except for 
amount of nuclear material) derived from 19 indicators and 56 sub-indicators 
within the 5 categories. Appendix D contains a complete breakout of indicators 
and sub-indicators. Lending to strength and standardization, in a further 
                                                          
184 Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, “A Framework for Analysis,” in Engaging 
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domestic legislation to determine whether countries are complying,” for in this instance, the 
existence of legislation is evidence of implementation. Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. 
Jacobson, “A Framework for Analysis,” in Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with 
International Environmental Accords, ed. Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998):  2.   
 
 67 
 
attempt to remove human error, the sub-indicators are generally binary. Scores 
can range from 0 to 100, though no nation is at either of those extremes. The 
NTI Index covers 2012 and 2014.186 Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the 
NTI Index. 
Among the 19 indicators in the NTI Index is UNSCR 1540 
Implementation (in the Domestic Commitments and Capacity category), which 
includes UNSCR 1540 reporting and the Extent of UNSCR 1540 
Implementation as sub-indicators. Consequently, I coded a second dependent 
variable based on this indicator (NTI_1540_n). This is an ordered variable with 
values from 0 to 100 in intervals of 10 with lower values indicating little or no 
implementation and higher values nearing complete implementation. 
Hypothesis 1b uses a different dependent variable, a narrow look at the 
implementation of UNSCR 1540 – one of the 19 components of the greater NP 
regime. Hypothesis 1b predicts increased UNSCR 1540 implementation due to 
increased rule of law. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the dependent 
variable based upon UNSCR 1540 Implementation. 
  
                                                          
186 Samantha Pitts-Kiefer and Page Southland, NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index, 2, 9, 37-
39, 56-58. The Domestic Commitments and Capability category specifically includes UNSCR 
1540 Implementation, Domestic Nuclear Materials Security Legislation, Safeguards Adherence 
and Compliance, and Independent Regulatory Agency. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of the NTI Index 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the UNSCR 1540 Implementation Variable 
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The variables that predict compliance - as expressed in the NTI Index - 
encompass two categories. These measures include both a rule of law indicator, 
and regional proportional compliance.  
The rule of law indicator is the World Governance Indicator (RoL_WGI) 
from the World Bank and the Brookings institution. This database captures 
data from 31 different sources and aggregates into six categories.187 The rule of 
law indicator, “captur[es] perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.”188 
De la Croix and Delavallade studied the relationships among corruption, 
income growth, judicial institution strength, and political institutions. They 
used the different World Governance Indicators for rule of law and extent of 
corruption. Rule of Law “is an aggregate of perceptions of the quality of 
contract enforcement and property rights, the likelihood of crime, and the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary.”189 Their study found that a 
weak judiciary makes corruption easier and more prevalent. States with a low 
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Working Paper No. 5430, 4. (The six indicators are Voice and Accountability, Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of 
Law, and Control of Corruption.) 
188 Kaufmann, et.al. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators…,” 6. 
189 David de la Croix, and Clara Delavallade, “Democracy, Rule of Law, Corruption Incentives, 
and Growth,” Journal of Public Economic Theory 13, no. 2 (2011), 170. 
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WGI rule of law score also score low in other indicators of accountability such 
as political rights.190 
Using WGI as a rule of law measure is only one of many ways to measure 
this variable. At appendix A, I outline the results of analyses using two 
alternative rule of law indicators. The results are consistent. I detail these 
alternative measures, Contract Intensive Money and the Corruption 
Perceptions Index within the DV and IV table at appendix B. 
In addition, I test the effect of Competitiveness of Participation (ParComp) 
a variable I take from the Polity IV dataset. This variable measures the amount 
of participation by parties and individuals opposed to the ruling regime the 
governmental system allows. It is coded from 1 to 5 which corresponds to the 
following categories that indicate national government situations that span 
from no competitiveness through regular participation by enduring political 
groups: repressed, suppressed, factional, transitional, or competitive.191 
Patricia Weitsman and George Shambaugh used the ParComp variable in a 
study of governmental risk-taking between 1816 and 1992. They found a 
strong association between conservative governmental decision-making and not 
only democracies, but also specifically those democracies with highly 
                                                          
190 De la Croix and Dellavallade, Democracy, Rule of Law…,” 175. 
191 Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013, Dataset Users’ Manual (Center for Systemic Peace, 
2014): 26-28, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf (accessed November 
3, 2015); Patricia A. Weitsman, and George E. Shambaugh. 2002. “International Systems, 
Domestic Structures, and Risk,” Journal of Peace Research 39 (3), 301. 
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competitive political systems.192 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et.al., found a 
significant relationship between increased participation and competition and 
compliance with human rights norms.193 I predict that increased competitive 
participation within a nation’s government will predict increased compliance 
with the nonproliferation norm and specifically with UNSCR 1540 
implementation. This prediction is based upon the idea that in a highly 
competitive political environment, the goods produced by office holders must 
benefit a larger proportion of society. In a low-competitive environment, the 
leaders must satisfy a smaller segment. Compliance with NP norms benefits all 
society in terms of safety, security, and opportunity. 
The next variable I use in the model is proportional compliance at the 
regional level.  The premise behind proportional compliance is that nations are 
more likely to comply with regime obligations if the number of complying 
nations increases.  In other words, the proportion of compliant nations is a 
factor in predicting an individual nation’s compliance.  In studying the 
commitment and compliance with the International Monetary Fund’s Article 
VIII requirement for unrestricted exchange (essentially disallowing restriction 
on things like imports or cash outflow) Beth Simmons found across both the 
international system and the region, commitment increased as the proportion 
of committed states increased.194 Members tend to commit to a regime’s 
                                                          
192 Patricia A. Weitsman, and George E. Shambaugh. 2002. “International Systems, Domestic 
Structures, and Risk,” Journal of Peace Research 39 (3), 306. 
193 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, George W. Downs, Alastair Smith, and Feryal Marie Cherif., 
“Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights,” International 
Studies Quarterly 49 (3) (2005): 453. 
194 Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior...,” 824. 
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obligations because others around them commit and once they begin to 
comply, compliance becomes routine.   
In a study of money regimes, Simmons found that commitment to the 
regime’s tenets increased as the proportion of committed states increased and 
was particularly prevalent among states in the same region.195  Once a nation 
joins the regime, however, subsequent non-compliance decreases because 
“[m]ost institutions are easier to maintain than to establish.”196  Maintenance 
and continued adherence to a regime derives from legitimacy based upon 
patterned behavior.197  In fact, repetition bolsters even imposed regimes.198   
I use the Proportion of Regional compliance measure to control for the 
effects of regional influence. These variables – calculated from different data for 
each DV - predict that as the compliance percentage of states in a region rises, 
additional states will also comply. Essentially a high percentage of adhering 
nations will yield additional adherence through increased institutionalization 
locking in the principles and norms of the NP Regime. Simmons developed this 
variable and found when testing the international compliance within the 
international monetary regime that increasing the proportion of both 
                                                          
195 Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior...,” 824. 
196 Robert Jervis, System Effects:  Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 38; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in 
the World Political Economy, 2005 ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 50, 100, 
102. 
197 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,” in International Regimes, ed., Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 18; Robert O. Keohane, “International Relations and International Law: Two Optics,” 
Harvard International Law Journal 38, no. 2 (1997): 491. 
198 Oran R. Young, “Regime Dynamics:  The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” in 
International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983): 102.. 
 
 73 
 
international and regional compliance had a positive effect.199  I predict that 
regional compliance in both the NP regime and specifically in implementing 
UNSCR 1540 will have a positive effect within the region.  
Goodliffe and Hawkins utilized a similar approach when testing 
ratification of the CAT.  They too found a positive effect within the region.200  I 
incorporate both system and regional proportion within the model developed in 
this section.   As a result, I develop another measure that averages the 
compliance or implementation scores for each major region in the world as 
delineated by the Correlates of War project (North America, South America, 
Europe, Africa, Middle East-North Africa, and the Asia-Pacific).201 
This dataset contains partial information on 180 nations and full 
information on 115 nations, a majority of UN member states.202 With this 
dataset I am trying to determine which factors influence members of the risk 
set to comply with the mandates of UNSCR 1540. What follows is the 
regression form of the models: 
                                                          
199 Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior:  Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000):  
824. 
200 Jay Goodliffe and Darren G. Hawkins, “Explaining Commitment:  States and the Convention 
against Torture,” Journal of Politics 68, no. 2 (May 2006):  365; Regional pressure has been 
found to be more important than general international pressure when it comes to encouraging 
a state to comply with certain norms (Simmons, Beth. 2000. “International Law and State 
Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” American Political 
Science Review 94(4):819-35.) This is due to the fact that regional countries not only tend to 
share a common heritage and culture, which increases opportunity for understanding and 
cooperation, but also tend to be each other’s largest trading partners due to the cost-
effectiveness of trading with those nearby as opposed to those on the other side of the globe. 
201 Goodliffe and Hawkins used regions defined by The World Bank:  Africa, East Asia and 
Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, 
and South Asia. 
202 The lists of nations within each analysis appears at appendix C. 
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H1a: Compliance(NP Regime) = β0 + βRule of Law + βCompetitive Participation + βRegional 
Compliance + e  
H1b: Compliance(UNSCR 1540 Implementation) = β0 + βRule of Law + βCompetitive Participation + 
βRegional Compliance + e 
 
Appendix B captures and summarizes all the variables and sources 
within this chapter. This table illustrates problems encountered both with 
using temporal proximity to the observations. One rule of law measure,  
contract intensive money, suffers from lags in reporting and calculations within 
a nation’s monetary system. In time, these data will improve through reporting 
and investigation. This model captures the essential predictors of regime 
implementation and allows the researcher to identify a nation’s shortcomings 
when that nation fails to comply with the tenets of the regime. With a better 
understanding, one can credibly determine whether a regime is, or has the 
potential to be, successful. 
Analysis 
Because the dataset is small, I chose to run this with a bootstrap in 
order to increase the reliability of the results.203 Both analyses exhibited solid 
goodness-of-fit indicators, however, this may result from the effect of the 
                                                          
203 Bradley Efron, “Better Bootstrap Confidence Intervals,” Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 82 (397) (1987): 171. 
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regional compliance control variable. Table 2 summarizes the results from the 
regression analysis: 
76 
 
Table 1: Regression Results, World Governance Indicators 
 
Variable H1a: NTI Index H1b: 1540 Implementation Score 
 Coeff Std Error P>|z| 95% Conf Interval Coeff Std 
Error 
P>|z
| 
95% Conf Interval 
Rule of Law (World 
Governance Indicator) 
13.758 4.614 .000 12.029 15.487 9.252 1.361 .000 6.584 11.920 
Competitiveness w/in 
Govt 
.074 .083 .371 -.886 .237 .089 .054 .098 -.016 .194 
Regional Compliance 
Mean 
-29.76 13.797 .031 -56.801 -2.719 .893 .059 .000 -.016 .194 
Constant 39.471 8.192 .000 23.414 55.527 -13.618 2.942 .000 -19.384 -7.85 
Goodness of Fit R2 = .523 Adjusted R2 = .516 R2 = .642 Adjusted R2 = .639 
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Hypothesis 1a used compliance with the NP regime as a dependent 
variable (NTI Index). This hypothesis predicted that as a nation exhibited a 
greater respect for the rule of law, compliance with the NP regime would 
increase. The results from the regression analysis lend support to this 
hypothesis and indicate a strong relationship between compliance with the NP 
regime’s two variables: rule of law and regional proportional compliance.  
Included at Figure 3 is the scatter plot of the WGI Rule of Law Indictor 
and Compliance with the NP Regime. This figure illustrates a correlation 
between the two variables and lends support to the regression results. 
Figure 3: Scatterplot of WGI Rule of Law and NP Compliance 
 
In those nations that have a strong judiciary and enforcement processes 
we can expect a high compliance with the NP regime. Nations that must 
depend upon individual actions like cash transactions – since credit lacks 
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enforceability – will exhibit lower rates of NP compliance. Using the WGI data 
provides significant results for the rule of law measure. This analysis shows 
that for compliance with the non-proliferation regime, rule of law and regional 
compliance are the most significant predictors with the competitiveness in 
government variable offering no significant explanatory value.204 A nation that 
exhibits strong rule of law tendencies through an enforceable banking system 
should tend to comply with international norms.  
The control variable of regional compliance indicates a strong regional 
relationship among nations. Nations tend to mirror their region and either 
increase NP regime compliance with their neighbors or remain low as a region. 
These findings are consistent Simmons’ results in studying money regimes that 
showed commitment to the regime’s tenets increased as the proportion of 
committed states increased, particularly among states in the same region.205   
When considering hypothesis 2, the implementation of UNSCR 1540, the 
results are even stronger as exhibited by the strength of the goodness of fit 
indicator (exhibiting an adjusted R2 of .639 versus the .516 found in the overall 
NP regime compliance). This analysis shows that for implementation of the 
mandates with UNSCR 1540, as above, rule of law and regional compliance 
                                                          
204 By description, the Rule of Law and Competitive Government variables would naturally 
seem to overlap in measurement, resulting in collinearity. If so, this would affect the 
coefficients, making their value uncertain, leading to false conclusions. I used two STATA add-
ins to test for collinearity. Both the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test and the Collinearity 
(COLLIN) test indicated that collinearity was well within acceptable limits for these factors. 
Furthermore, there was no multicollinearity when I tested all the factors simultaneously. This 
remained consistent with the Contract Intensive Money and the Corruption Perceptions Index 
rule of law proxies as well. Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Data Analysis: An Introduction (Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, 1985), 62. 
205 Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior...,” 824. 
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remain the most significant predictors. The fact that money is safe, and 
contracts enforceable in functioning courts, also predicts implementation with 
the specifics of UNSCR 1540. The regional mean variable retains significance. 
As in the compliance model, above, the competitiveness of government is not, 
comparatively, very explanatory.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter began with a look at the NP regime and a relatively new part 
of it, UNSCR 1540, a mandate for UN member nations to enact and enforce 
domestic legislation criminalizing the proliferation of WMD and dual-use 
technologies by non-state actors. The proliferation of WMD by non-state actors 
presents a threat to all nations and the system as a whole and successful NP 
efforts benefit all. This chapter contains a new approach to measuring and 
finding the factors important to compliance. Using the Nuclear Threat Initiative 
Index and select subcategories, the analyses focused on the role of rule of law 
and the competitiveness of participation, with regional implementation as a 
control. 
The results of this chapter indicate a strong relationship between each of 
these indicators and a nation’s compliance with the overall NP regime. As 
nations become more stable in monetary transactions, their compliance will 
increase. For most nations, stable transactions and good governance leads to 
additional international transactions - potentially opening markets and 
opportunities for trade. Similarly, a political system that includes and 
 80 
 
encourages competition among many participants supports compliance with 
the NP regime. 
Using the specific implementation of UNSCR 1540 as a dependent 
variable remained consistent with NP regime compliance. The rule of law and 
the regional compliance measures were significant, with little explanatory 
power attributed to the presence of a participatory government. These results 
indicate a nation will institutionalize the NP norms, and comply with the 
specifics of implementation. Using Krasner’s definition as a lens to observe 
these results reveals nations in concert with the principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures.206 Of course, compliance with the latter two 
categories is easier to measure. 
While these results are positive, the data and analysis are not without 
criticism. The years studied are 2012 and 2014. For many nations, the 2014 
data are either preliminary or incomplete. The IMF continues to refine the 
information based on their normalizing and verification procedures following 
receipt. Additionally, the Eurozone is not as homogenous as the data make it 
appear. The 19 members of the Eurozone report similar rule of law measures, 
which though accurate, does not reveal anything about the differences among 
these nations. The NTI Index itself has differences in that there are additional 
subcategories in the scores for the 25 current nations, and 31 nations in 2012 
                                                          
206 “[S]ets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given [issue] area of international relations,” 
Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,” in International Regimes, ed., Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 2. 
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that possess 1 kilogram or more of weapons grade nuclear material. Separating 
the data from the Eurozone and the nuclear nations into unique individual 
observations and conducting analyses on them and the remaining nations will 
potentially reveal differences in analysis results. 
The results in this chapter lend support to liberal theories of peace and 
the international system. Regimes dilute the central power of a state and limit 
the effect of self-interested decision-making without directly challenging 
sovereignty.207 The passing of UNSCR 1540 drives directly toward domestic 
politics and, necessarily, a liberal view of the international system. Liberal 
institutionalists believe that regimes bridge the differences between states and 
encourage increased dialogue. UNSCR 1540 specifically does not demand 
accession to any treaty; however, the mandate for domestic legislation limits 
the sovereignty of some nations and places them on the path to compliance 
with the NP regime. This chapter contributes to liberal theories of international 
relations because the results tie domestic actions to system cooperation for a 
common good. 
                                                          
207 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence 2nd ed. (New York:  
Harper Collins, 1989), 30-31. 
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Five: Case Studies of Argentina, South Africa, and Malaysia 
The last chapter detailed an empirical test of two hypotheses based on 
using the rule of law as a predictor for compliance with both the non-
proliferation regime and the specific mandates of UNSCR 1540. Rule of law 
represented an independent judicial system free of influence from external 
influence, notably from other political branches.208 I used three different 
proxies for rule of law: World Governance Indicators, Corruption Perceptions 
Index, and contract intensive money. Control variables included political 
competition and regional influence. The test results included strong support for 
the hypothesis that states with a strong rule of law will exhibit better 
compliance with both the NP regime and the UNSCR 1540 mandates. Regional 
compliance also proved a strong predictor. 
The previous chapter and quantitative research generally, can produce 
precise results that lack descriptive explanation; such explanation is 
particularly important to international relations.209 Tarrow, in his work, 
“Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide,” outlines six methods for 
combining quantitative and qualitative studies, including triangulation or the 
combination of methods in order to increase inferential leverage.210 This paper 
                                                          
208 Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior:  Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000):  
832. 
209 King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sydney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 4. 
210 Tarrow, Sidney. 2004. “Bridging the Quantitative – Qualitative Divide.” In Henry E. Brady 
and David Collier (eds.), 106-107. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. 
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. 
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uses quantitative data as a departure point for the case studies below. With 
them, I attempt to put some “qualitative flesh on quantitative bones” by 
focusing analysis in this chapter on the same problem of regime compliance 
addressed in chapter four.211 
This chapter will further explore the theoretical arguments tested in 
chapter four by engaging in three case studies. The case studies focus on the 
explanatory variables developed in the previous chapter. I expect the concepts 
of rule of law, competitive political participation, and regional compliance will 
correlate with individual states’ compliance with the NP regime and 
implementation of UNSCR 1540 mandates. 
I used a two-step method based upon relevance and characteristics to 
select countries for case study. Crail identified 84 “key” states – those for whom 
UNSCR 1540 is most relevant - within the NP regime.212 Identifying these 
incorporated two criteria, primary origin states, and transit states. Primary 
origin states are those that “have declared, or been suspected of maintaining, a 
stockpile of or program for the development of nuclear, biological, and/or 
chemical weapons.”213 Transit states are those that pose a risk because of the 
                                                          
211 Tarrow, Sidney. 2004. “Bridging the Quantitative – Qualitative Divide.” In Henry E. Brady 
and David Collier (eds.), 106-107. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. 
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. 
212 Peter Crail, “Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” Nonproliferation Review 
13, No. 2 (July 2006), 361. 
213 Crail, 362. This includes “[s]tates that have declared WMD capabilities include those 
recognized in relevant treaties, as well as states outside those treaties, that have publicly 
confirmed such capabilities…states that have declared clandestine WMD capabilities and are in 
the process of dismantling their weapons and programs….states that have been suspected of 
maintaining WMD capabilities… and[s]tates that formerly possessed WMD or WMD programs.” 
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potential for people to transport WMD across or through them. Crail’s list of 84 
states account for all the known WMD origin states as well as over 80% of the 
world’s container traffic.214 
Realizing that I am engaging in non-random case selection I took steps to 
prevent bias. I endeavor to select cases based upon the explanatory value of 
rule of law and not the dependent variables of either compliance or 
implementation. Selection without any reference to compliance or 
implementation should ensure that the studies avoid biased causal 
inferences.215 Thus, I selected the three states for study without reference to 
either dependent variable or even compliance with other regimes. 
The selection process took place as follows: I ordered the rule of law 
scores from least to greatest and marked each country that also appeared on 
Crail’s list. Crail further broke down the key states by identifying the reasons 
they appeared (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and/or Transit).216 It is 
appropriate to use data-richness among the criteria for case selection because 
the case studies must be meaningful in order to be illustrative.217 Bearing this 
in mind, I further refined the list to only include cases that met three or more 
of the Crail criteria, including nuclear potential. I then selected one of these 
countries from among the lower, middle, and top thirds of the rule of law 
scores. The countries I selected are Argentina, South Africa, and Malaysia.  
                                                          
214 Crail, 365. 
215 King, Keohane, and Verba, 128 
216 Crail, 366-7. 
217 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca:  Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 79. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. I introduce each case study and 
describe the history, government, judiciary, economy, and other relevant 
factors that seemingly predict compliance with the NP regime and UNSCR 
1540. Then I compare these qualitative facts against the empirical data for 
each country to evaluate the predictive value of the model from the previous 
chapter.  
Argentina 
Argentina, along with Brazil is one of only two South American states 
with a nuclear nexus. It is a nuclear power-producing country but not a 
nuclear weapon state. For many years, Argentina and Brazil worked on rival 
nuclear and missile programs that seemed to head them in the direction of 
nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, both 
nations completed transitions from military to civilian government and 
renounced any plans for nuclear weapon development. They signed a bilateral 
treaty that established a nuclear inspection agency to ensure the other used 
nuclear energy for only peaceful purposes.  
In addition to this important treaty, Argentina signed the NPT as a non-
nuclear weapon state. Accession to two other treaties also indicate Argentina’s 
position: The Treaty of Tlatelolco establishes a nuclear weapons free zone in 
Central and South America, and membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
a commitment by member nations to export nuclear technology only to nations 
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with strong non-proliferation standards.218 This treaty is an important regional 
international organization that declares Latin and South America as well as the 
Caribbean a nuclear weapons free zone. Every nation in the region, including 
those with overseas possessions in the region, have ratified this treaty. 
Currently, Argentina is operating three nuclear power plants that 
together produce about 10% of their energy. There are plans to build another 
reactor in cooperation with China and there is a cooperation agreement with 
Russia that has not yet produced any firm plans for additional nuclear 
activities. 
Following the World Governance Indicator (WGI) measure, Argentina 
scored in the lower third of states. This rule of law indicator captures 
“perceptions of the quality of contract enforcement and property rights, the 
likelihood of crime, and the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary.”219 
Thus, it includes a property-rights measure that shows the trust an investor, 
particularly a non-native investor, has in the ability of the courts to enforce 
contracts or justly settle other property disputes.  
Economically, Argentina declined in the 20th century and has fared 
poorly in the 21st. The decline followed judicial approval of the 1930 coup d’état 
that ousted the democratically elected president. Probably before 1930, but 
certainly after, the judiciary began to lose its independence from the other 
                                                          
218 The long form of this treaty is The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
219 David de la Croix, and Clara Delavallade, “Democracy, Rule of Law, Corruption Incentives, 
and Growth,” Journal of Public Economic Theory 13, no. 2 (2011), 170. 
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branches of government, primarily the executive.220 Argentina’s constitution, 
much like that of the United States, calls for executive nomination and 
legislative approval of the judiciary. In Argentina, however, the legislature 
largely rubber-stamps the president’s selections. The result of such an 
independence loss makes members of the judiciary politically reliant upon the 
executive for their positions. Thus, they are less likely to rule against the 
executive or those he or she favors. 
Argentina is a presidential republic with three branches of government. 
The government consists of an executive branch, a bicameral legislature with a 
Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, and a Supreme Court, whose members can 
serve until age 75. This system of constitutional government has been in place 
since 1862 and worked well until 1930. Since then, however, there have been 
numerous governments, including 6 military governments. Military and civilian 
coups forcibly removed 12 presidents. Electoral rules place much power in the 
governorships of the nation’s 23 provinces and federal capital (treated as a 24th 
province). This power derives from the ability to name candidates for election 
from among closed party lists, and the power to spend federal money. Smaller 
provinces benefit disproportionately because they have a higher density of 
representation and they receive more money than they pay in federal taxes.221 
                                                          
220 “Becoming a Serious Country,” Economist, June 3, 2004, 
http://www.economist.com/node/2704457 (accessed January 4, 2017); Matías Iaryczower, 
Pablo T. Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi, "Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, 
Argentina 1935-1998," American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (2002), 700. 
221 Pablo T Spiller and Mariano Tommasi, "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A 
Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 19, no. 2 (2003), 296. 
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Argentinian government appears competitive according to its constitution, in 
practice, however, a small number of political elites in the provinces hold most 
of the power. Members of the federal legislature have short terms of service 
because, opposite to what the United States witnesses, legislators aspire to 
graduate “down” the provincial government versus up to federal service. 
Decades of government turmoil, characterized by authoritarian violence 
and disregard for the rule of law, ended with democratic elections following 
Argentina’s 1982 loss in the war with Great Britain over the Islas 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands. Until the 21st century, the years following the 1930 
coup witnessed Argentinian presidents averaging 2.6 years in office, with 
legislators averaging 2.9 and appointed-for-life Supreme Court justices 
averaging 4.6.222 In addition to short tenures (sometimes due to executive-
influenced impeachment by the congress), the courts have lost independence 
due to court enlargement efforts. The result of these facts is a political court 
that is rarely in opposition to the executive.223  
In 2001, the country saw a bank run resulting from an economic 
depression and a public uncertain that the nation could service its internal and 
external debt. Consequently, in December 2001, the president declared a 
default on over $100 billion of the country’s foreign debt and devalued the 
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exchange rate by 75%.224 The economy worsened in the near term, but has 
slowly moved toward stabilization, though it remains in recession. In May 
2012, Argentina nationalized the oil company YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales) forcing an additional debt on the nation and damaging foreign 
investment. Currently, Argentina is both very restrictive on imports and on its 
currency controls to restrain currency flight. It is in default on many 
international debts, including settlement agreements resulting from the 2001 
crisis.225 The country has not engaged in court-advised negotiations with other 
acknowledged creditors. 
The hypotheses, used in this paper predict that Argentina would comply 
poorly with both the NP regime and the mandates of UNSCR 1540. The results, 
however, are not as predicted. Argentina exhibits varying levels of respect for 
the rule of law based on the different indicators used, and it scores very high in 
political competitiveness measured in 2012 and 2014.  
Table 2: Compliance Predictors and Indicators for Argentina 
 
                                                          
224 Benjamin Hebert and Jesse Schreger, “The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from 
Argentina,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 22270, May 2017, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22270 (accessed December 29, 2016); Mekay, Emad. 2002. 
"Finance: Argentina Pays Small Fraction Only of World Bank Debt," Global Information 
Network, Nov 15, 1;  
225 Hebert and Schreger, “The Costs of Sovereign Default…” 
Indicator/ Regional Mean 2012 2014
NP Compliance   72     54.33   
76     55.08
UNSCR 1540   92      60   
92         60
ParComp (max=5) 4 4
Rule of law - CIM 0.25 0.26
Rule of Law - WGI 1.79 1.56
Rule of law - Corruption 35 34
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Yet, Argentina is highly compliant with both the NP regime and the 
UNSCR 1540 mandates. This nation scores well above the regional mean for 
both, including an almost perfect (92/100) score for UNSCR 1540 
implementation. None of the rule of law measures predicts this level of 
compliance. In this case, it appears that the region is the most dominant factor 
in predicting Argentina’s success. 
 
Table 3: Argentina’s Region and Compliance 
Argentina 
  Compliance Implementation 
Country 2012 2014 2012 2014 
Regional Mean 54.33333 55.08333 60 60 
Argentina 72 76 92 92 
Belize 33 33 26 26 
Bolivia 37 37 33 33 
Brazil 65 67 100 100 
Chile 74 74 60 60 
Colombia 52 53 52 52 
Ecuador 48 49 55 55 
Guyana 35 35 20 20 
Mexico 78 85 100 100 
Paraguay 55 55 51 51 
Peru 70 70 93 93 
Suriname 42 42 67 67 
Uruguay 70 70 87 87 
Venezuela 37 37 48 48 
 
Argentina is a regional leader, and among the most compliant in the 
entire system. Each of the rule of law indicators paints a negative picture for 
Argentina. Argentina is in the lower third for all three rule of law measures, 
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indicating a lack of confidence in the justice system, particularly in the “quality 
of contract enforcement and property rights.”226 
Regional compliance is solid, but Argentina is significantly above the 
average, with the region itself scoring in the middle third for compliance. 
Something else must influence Argentina. Brazil, also well above the average, is 
the most relevant state to Argentina in NP terms. Brazil scores a 65 (54.33 
regional average) in NP compliance, and a perfect 100 (regional average 60) for 
UNSCR 1540 implementation.  
This raises the potential for alternative hypotheses. Is regional 
compliance alone the indicator or does “rival” compliance provide better 
predictability? Perhaps cooperative compliance is the predictor. Either a rival a 
rival or cooperative hypotheses have support in the case of Argentina’s 
compliance. While now tied very closely, Argentina and Brazil are long-time 
competitors in every aspect. They simultaneously engaged in nuclear weapons 
development, a conventional arms race, and rival space programs. These 
nations worked through territory disputes as well. With a relationship now 
better termed as cooperative, these two nations lead their region in compliance. 
Trade probably also plays a part in Argentina’s compliance. Without a 
true military or nuclear rivalry on its border, Argentina may choose 
conspicuous compliance as a method to build and maintain relationships that 
                                                          
226 226 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues,” (September 2010). World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 5430, 4. 
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can lead to more immediate gains. In this case, compliance is almost easier 
than non-compliance and avoids international attention on non-proliferation 
commitment. Argentina and Brazil have successfully given this issue second-
tier status in the region.  
Much of Argentina’s trade is with fellow Mercosur nations of which Brazil 
is a dominant member. Its main trading partners are Brazil, China, the US, 
Chile, Venezuela, Germany, and Bolivia. Soybean meal, soybean oil, soybeans, 
and corn account for over 33% of Argentina’s exports.227 Avoiding trade conflict 
with Brazil through compliance and implementation may also explain 
Argentina’s exceptional scores. 
Mercosur is a trade agreement among many South American nations.228 
This agreement promotes a free trade zone among member nations. 
Importantly however, Mercosur includes agreements to adjust domestic laws 
that inhibit the free trade. Thus, it is an international organization that directly 
references the sovereign processes of domestic governance. 
Argentina was late to the compliance arena. The timing of Argentina’s 
outward acceptance of the NP regime’s norms may boost compliance. Despite 
developing nuclear technology – even slowly pursuing a weapon – starting in 
the 1950s and using nuclear power to generate electricity for many years, 
                                                          
227 AJG Simoes, and CA Hidalgo, “The Economic Complexity Observatory: An Analytical Tool for 
Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development,” Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2011), http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/arg 
(accessed March 4, 2017). 
228 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela (suspended) with associate members  
Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Suriname.  
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Argentina did not join the NPT until the mid-1990s. Like a religious convert 
becoming the most devout, Argentina’s compliance may be related to its 
relatively recent embrace of international agreements despite a long history of 
nuclear involvement. The fact that Argentina acceded to the NPT so late may 
also indicate a greater commitment to the regime. While this is an area ripe for 
additional study, hypothesis formation would begin with the concept that a late 
convert is a usually a more devout adherent. 
The previous discussion addresses compliance with the NP regime, a 
regime of universal application. Yet, membership in the regional international 
organizations and regional treaties may prove a better predictor of compliance. 
This is a complementary hypothesis that amplifies the reasons for regional 
influence in compliance. Thus, trade is an influence, but in the context that it 
is the currency of Mercosur membership. Perhaps membership in and 
compliance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the expectations of regional 
international groups like the Organization of American States – or more likely 
the smaller group UNASUR - drive Argentina to high levels of NP compliance.229 
Compliance is a function of factors that include fear of condemnation by those 
Argentina finds most beneficial, the neighbors to which it has made direct 
commitment.  
South Africa 
                                                          
229 UNASUR is the (in English) Union of South American Nations, a South American 
continental international group that works toward more cooperation among these 12 nations. 
Initiatives include a Bank, freedom of human movement, and the interoceanic highway 
connecting both sides of the continent. 
 94 
 
South Africa is home to the continent’s only nuclear facilities, two power-
generating reactors. This nation developed both nuclear power capability and 
nuclear weapons. In the 1970s, they used nuclear explosions for mining. 
Beginning in 1989, along with the election of F. W. de Klerk, the leader who 
abolished apartheid in 1991 then oversaw universal elections in 1994, South 
Africa ended its nuclear weapons program and disposed of any weapons it 
had.230 It acceded to the NPT in 1991 and is now a member of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as well.  
It gains about 5% of its power from two nuclear power plants that came 
on line about 30 years ago. As South Africa prepares to expand its nuclear 
power generation and seeks potential partners and investors, it has signed 
agreements with the US, Russia, China, South Korea, and France as well as 
various private industries. 
Economically, South Africa has had a turbulent history. Founded in the 
17th century by the Dutch, it came under British control early in the 19th 
century. After numerous wars between the Dutch descendants and the British, 
South Africa became part of the British Commonwealth from 1910 through 
1961. In 1948, South Africa instituted apartheid, a whites-only rule that 
entrenched the small minority of Afrikaners in power over the black population. 
The policy of apartheid eventually made South Africa a pariah nation. 
                                                          
230 Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological 
Warfare Program (Maxwell Air Force Base: The USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2001), 42. 
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Starting in the 1960s, nations began sanctioning South Africa in 
response to apartheid.231 More damaging, however, was the effect of private 
firms refusing to do business with and within the nation.232 These sanctions 
economically isolated an already geographically isolated country. Abolishing 
the nuclear weapon program sent an early signal that South Africa intended to 
rejoin the community of nations from which it found itself on the outside as a 
result of apartheid. In addition, the nuclear weapon program was costly and 
abandoning it freed funds for other military and civilian purposes.233  
South Africa is a parliamentary republic with the President serving as the 
chief of state and head of government. There is a bicameral legislature 
consisting of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. The 
National Assembly consists of directly elected representatives with seats 
allocated proportionately. The National Assembly elects the president from 
among its members. The National Council consists of 10 representatives 
appointed from each of the 9 provinces. This body’s charter includes 
representing special provincial interests. While currently dominated by one 
party, the African National Congress (ANC), there are many political parties 
active in South African government and represented in the National Assembly. 
The ANC, however, has ruled South Africa since 1994 when apartheid ended 
and the nation held its first universal elections.  
                                                          
231 Philip I. Levy, "Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do?" American Economic Review 
89, no. 2 (1999), 416. 
232 Philip I. Levy, "Sanctions on South Africa…, " 418. 
233 Burgess and Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa’s… 27. 
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The first president was Nelson Mandela, the apartheid protestor jailed for 
27 years (and ultimately released) by the previous Afrikaner-dominated 
government. In 1998, Thabo Mbeki became president with Jacob Zuma as his 
deputy. In 2005, pending a corruption case against his deputy, Mbeki 
dismissed Zuma. Zuma also faced rape allegations. Subsequently, the state 
accused Mbeki of corruption, hastening his retirement from the presidency. 
Zuma then became president and since then has received additional 
accusations of corruption including self-enrichment for home upgrades at state 
expense.234 
The courts serve as a check on the President and the legislature for all 
constitutional issues. However, the Constitutional Court is the highest court 
for all matters, not just constitutional matters. 235 The highest court of general 
jurisdiction is the Supreme Court of Appeals, which consists of a president, 
deputy president, and 21 judges appointed by the nation’s president after 
consultation with the heads of the National Assembly. The members serve until 
discharged by an Act of Parliament. Recently, the courts ruled against 
President Zuma and ordered the release of a report both detailing potential 
corruption committed by him and recommending further inquiry. 
                                                          
234 Associated Press, “South African Watchdog Report Increases Pressure on President,” The 
Washington Post, November 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/south-
africa-watchdog-report-increases-pressure-on-president/2016/11/02/d2bb4764-a10f-11e6-
8d63-3e0a660f1f04_story.html?utm_term=.f6d3809a0805 (accessed January 23, 2017). 
235 K Malan, “Reassessing Judicial Independence and Impartiality Against the Backdrop of 
Judicial Appointments in South Africa,” Potchestroom Electronic Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 5 
(2014), 3, http://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/view/112104 (accessed February 21, 
2017). 
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For each of the rule of law proxies, South Africa scores near the mean: 
WGI (2.59 v. 2.49), CPI (.45 v. 42), and CIM (.45 v. .489). Thus, no matter how 
measured, South Africa is still solidly within the middle third. South Africa 
scores high (4 of 5) for political competitiveness, which measures the amount of 
participation the governmental system allows by parties and individuals 
opposed to the ruling regime. A “4” indicates a transitional government or one 
“accommodative of competing, parochial interests but,” not fully linking 
parochial interests with broader interests of applicability to the general 
population. In a transitional government, “sectarian and secular interest 
groups coexist.236 It is important to note that since such governments can be 
transitioning in either direction, not every move is positive.  I predicted that 
increased competitive participation within a nation’s government would yield 
increased compliance. 
In regional compliance, South Africa is considerably above the mean, 
scoring 30 points higher for NP compliance and 75 points higher for UNSCR 
1540 compliance in both 2012 and 2014. The region scores in the lower third 
for compliance, while South Africa is among the most compliant of these 
nations. Like Argentina, unless political competition is dominating the results, 
something else must influence compliance.  
                                                          
236 Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013, Dataset Users’ Manual (Center for Systemic Peace, 
2014): 31, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf (accessed November 3, 
2015). 
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Three of South Africa’s closest neighbors - Namibia, Botswana, and 
Mozambique – score above the regional mean for NP regime. Zimbabwe, 
however, does not, and the enclave countries of Swaziland and Lesotho record 
compliance levels above and consistent with the mean, respectively. In UNSCR 
1540 compliance, however, these neighbor nations, except for Namibia, are all 
below the very low mean of 24.58.  
The hypotheses, used in this paper predict South Africa to comply 
marginally with both the NP regime and the mandates of UNSCR 1540. Once 
again, the nation’s action defies the predictions. Using each of the rule of law 
measures, South Africa scores in the middle third of states indicating moderate 
trust in the judiciary to enforce property rights. South Africa scores very high 
in political competitiveness measured in 2012 and 2014.  
Table 4: Compliance Predictors and Indicators for South Africa 
 
An alternative explanation for compliance, as seen in the Argentina case 
study, is that the South African government simply values the regional treaties 
more than the worldwide treaties. South Africa is a member of the Treaty of 
Pelindaba or the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. This treaty 
includes all of South Africa’s contiguous neighbors and extends north to 
Indicator/ Regional Mean 2012 2014
NP Compliance   72     39.13   
71     40.04
UNSCR 1540 100      24.58
100      24.58
ParComp (max=5) 4 4
Rule of law - CIM 0.45 0.44
Rule of Law - WGI 2.59 2.67
Rule of law - Corruption 43 44
 99 
 
include most of their contiguous neighbors as well.237 In addition to an 
agreement to keep Africa nuclear weapons free, there is an additional protocol 
prohibiting nuclear weapon states from using or threatening to use a nuclear 
weapon against any party to the treaty or within a party’s territory.238 The US, 
China, France, the UK, and Russia have all signed this additional protocol to 
the Treaty of Pelindaba. 
Once again, the analytical results provide an opportunity for additional 
hypotheses. South Africa does not have a rival nation nearby, but it does have 
trade cooperative nations. Its main trading partners are China, the US, India, 
the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Germany, and Saudi Arabia (oil imports).239 
Gold, diamonds, and platinum account for almost 30% of South Africa’s 
exports. A simple compliance check of these nations reveals that South Africa’s 
compliance is on par with the nuclear nations in this group. The US, UK, and 
Germany are all highly compliant with both the NP regime and UNSCR 1540’s 
mandates (78/80, 78/100, and 85/100 respectively), with China and India 
splitting between the two dependent variables. Thus, trade may be the 
                                                          
237 The following nations have acceded to this treaty: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/african-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-
anwfz-treaty-pelindaba-treaty/ (accessed January 24, 2017). 
238 Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa Nuclear Weapon Free Treaty), 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/pelindaba (accessed February 28, 2017). 
239 AJG Simoes, and CA Hidalgo, “The Economic Complexity Observatory: An Analytical Tool for 
Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development,” Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2011), http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/zaf/ 
(accessed February 27, 2017). 
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dominant factor for a geographically isolated nation like South Africa (or even 
the US), with region (and maybe rivalry) more dominant for China and India. 
Table 5: South Africa’s Region and Compliance  
 
South Africa 
  Compliance Implementation 
Country 2012 2014 2012 2014 
Regional Mean 39.12766 40.04255 24.58333 24.58333 
South Africa 72 71 100 100 
Angola 27 27 20 20 
Benin 26 26 20 20 
Botswana 62 62 20 20 
Burkina Faso 51 48 40 40 
Burundi 28 29 0 0 
Cameroon 40 42 40 40 
Cape Verde 47 47 20 20 
Central African 
Republic 38 37 20 20 
Chad 20 20 0 0 
Comoros 35 35 20 20 
Congo (Brazzaville) 22 20 0 0 
Congo (Democratic 
Republic of) 58 57 80 80 
Côte d'Ivoire 28 53 20 20 
Djibouti 37 37 20 20 
Equatorial Guinea 22 22 0 0 
Eritrea 19 19 20 20 
Ethiopia 27 27 40 40 
Gabon 55 55 20 20 
Gambia 25 24 20 20 
Ghana 64 68 40 40 
Guinea 24 24 0 0 
Guinea-Bissau 29 29 0 0 
Kenya 56 52 40 40 
Lesotho 44 49 0 0 
Liberia 25 25 0 0 
Madagascar 43 46 40 40 
Malawi 33 33 0 0 
Mali 57 56 40 40 
Mauritania 40 41 0 0 
Mauritius 43 43 40 40 
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Malaysia 
Malaysia is a transit state, meaning there is a great potential that WMD 
would travel through it, especially if NP efforts failed in the originating state.240 
Malaysia has seven ports and accounts for the fourth highest container 
throughput in the world. A water nation that borders the busiest shipping 
point in the world, the Strait of Malacca, Malaysia is the only nation that 
shares a border with Singapore, the second busiest container port.241 
Malaysia is not yet a nuclear country; however, it has considered adding 
nuclear power to its existing energy-generation complex, but this is not an 
urgent need. Malaysia has the fourth largest oil and gas reserves in Asia and is 
                                                          
240 Peter Crail, “Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” Nonproliferation Review 
13, No. 2 (July 2006), 365. 
241 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Review of Maritime Transport 
2015,” Geneva, 2015, 1-122, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2015_en.pdf 
(accessed February 17, 2017). 
 
Mozambique 45 45 0 0 
Namibia 51 53 60 60 
Niger 57 58 40 40 
Nigeria 52 56 20 20 
Rwanda 57 58 40 40 
São Tomé and Príncipe 21 21 0 0 
Senegal 41 43 40 40 
Seychelles 63 63 40 40 
Sierra Leone 27 28 40 40 
Somalia 7 7 0 0 
Swaziland 36 39 0 0 
Tanzania 51 51 40 40 
Togo 33 36 40 40 
Uganda 50 50 40 40 
Zambia 29 29 20 20 
Zimbabwe 21 22 0 0 
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a net exporter of energy. Currently, Malaysia runs a nuclear reactor for 
research purposes only. The nation has not sought nuclear weapons.  
Malaysia has a complex government borne of colonial expansion and 
consolidation. Parts of what is now Malaysia became British colonies in the 
early part of the 19th century. The nation gained independence from the British 
in 1957 (forming the confederation of modern Malaysia in 1963) and largely 
adopted the government type of its colonial ruler. There is a king, however, who 
comes from among the leaders of the nine hereditary ruling houses in 
Malaysia. The king is largely ceremonial; however, he does play a substantive 
part in certain government areas. The king position rotates every five years in a 
set order. 
Like the British, there are three branches of government, which are led 
by a prime minister that the parliament indirectly elects from within. The 
parliament consists of a senate and a house. The senate has 70 seats of which 
26 come from the 13 states and 44 by appointment of the King. The house has 
222 directly and proportionally elected seats. 
There are many aspects to Malaysian law, which does not generally get 
good anecdotal marks for judicial independence or, in fairness, for politically 
motivated cases.242 The King, in close consultation with the prime Minister, 
appoints the federal judges who may serve until age 65.  This creates a 
situation where the judiciary is very close to the executive.  
                                                          
242 See generally, International Commission of Jurists, “Attacks on Justice 2005 – Malaysia,” 
August 15, 2008, https://www.icj.org/malaysia-attacks-on-justice-2005/ (accessed February 
26, 2017). 
 103 
 
Further complicating the jurisdiction of the courts are the Shariah Law 
courts which exist to hear cases involving Muslims with special reference to 
“marriage, divorce, guardianship, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, family 
laws, gifts, succession testate and intestate.”243 Over 60% of Malaysia is 
Muslim and it is the state religion. Practically speaking, however, the Shariah 
Courts will hear many cases outside of these prescriptions, especially if it 
pertains to certain Muslim restrictions, for example lending money with 
interest.244 
Malaysia’s states hold much political power. This nation is bifurcated 
with significant distance across the South China Sea separating the east and 
west parts. There are ethnic divisions as well that lend to diffusing power. West 
or Peninsular Malaysia counts many ethnic Malaysians and Chinese among the 
population. West Malaysia is the location of both the governmental and 
administrative capitals of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya, respectively. This is 
also the large Muslim area. East Malaysia includes many indigenous peoples. 
There are 13 states in Malaysia, 9 of which have hereditary rulers at the head. 
Political competition appears weak in Malaysia, but also falls into the 
transitional definition (4/5). Since independence, the nation has had only five 
prime ministers, and they are all from the same ruling coalition. Yet, these 
same conditions allowed the longest-serving prime minister, Mahathir 
                                                          
243 Ruzian Markom, Sharina Ali Pitchay, Zinatul Ashiqin Zainol, Anita Abdul Rahim, and 
Rooshida Merican Abdul Rahim Merican, “Adjudication of Islamic Banking and Finance cases 
in the civil Courts of Malaysia,” European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 36, no. 1 (2013), 
2. 
244 Markom, Pitchay, et.al., “Adjudication of Islamic Banking…,” 4. 
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Mohamed (1981-2003), to move the country from being primarily agriculture 
based to an industrial economy. Malaysia is one of the fastest-growing nations 
in the world, and leads Asia. Its main trading partners are Singapore, China, 
the US, Japan, and Thailand.245 Circuits, petroleum, and palm oil account for 
almost 30% of Malaysia’s exports.  
This case study would predict Malaysia to comply well with both the NP 
Regime and UNSCR 1540. Yet, it does not, and it lags its region. The region 
scores in the middle third for compliance. For the rule of law measures other 
than corruption, Malaysia scores in the top third of states indicating a high 
trust in the judiciary to enforce property rights.  
Table 6: Compliance Predictors and Indicators for Malaysia 
 
Again, this research confronts practical results the opposite of predicted. 
Clearly, something else must influence Malaysia’s compliance levels. The 
literature cited above, as well as the other case studies, point toward local 
nations or trade as an influence on compliance. I will first look at the closest 
neighbors then the trading partners. Malaysia’s closest neighbors are 
                                                          
245 AJG Simoes, and CA Hidalgo, “The Economic Complexity Observatory: An Analytical Tool for 
Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development,” Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2011), 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/mys/ (accessed February 27, 2017). 
Indicator/ Regional Mean 2012 2014
NP Compliance   40     45.57   
42     49
UNSCR 1540   40      53.16   
40       54.21
ParComp (max=5) 3 3
Rule of law - CIM 0.78 0.78
Rule of Law - WGI 3 3.14
Rule of law - Corruption 49 52
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Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar. 
Other than Singapore, Malaysia’s compliance is consistent with its neighbors. 
Singapore’s perfect compliance with UNSCR 1540’s mandates may also be a 
function of that nation’s tremendous administrative capability – it only scores 
60 of 100 for NP regime compliance.  
Next, a simple comparison with China reveals compliance consistent with 
this influential nuclear weapon state. There is also a tremendous Chinese 
influence in the Malaysia with both ethnic Chinese (over 20% of population) 
and China’s claims too much of Malaysia’s territorial sea. China is Malaysia’s 
second largest trading partner (behind Singapore). 
Finally, I’ll remove the regional outliers, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
and South Korea. For trade purposes, these nations arguably feel influence 
more from outside their region – specifically with the US and the EU nations – 
than within the region. Removing the outliers reveals a Malaysia with 
compliance levels in line with its regional neighbors. The new means appear 
below in Table 7. 
Table 7: Adjusted Regional Mean (removing outliers) 
  Compliance Implementation 
Country 2012 2014 2012 2014 
Adj Regional Mean 41 42.2963 46.667 47.778 
Malaysia 40 42 40 40 
 
In earlier case studies, I noted the timing of accession to the treaty 
obligations. Malaysia was early to the compliance arena and this may make 
them less concerned with compliance. Malaysia was one of the early ratifiers of 
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the NPT.246 Unlike the devout Argentina, poor compliance may be related to the 
long-standing commitment to the NP regime. For a nation with very little 
nuclear nexus, actual adherence is not difficult and UNSCR 1540 compliance 
seen as unnecessary. This raises the possibility of a parallel hypothesis to the 
proposal that a late convert is a usually a more devout adherent.  
Table 8: Malaysia’s Region and Compliance  
                                                          
246 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (accessed March 6, 2017). 
Malaysia 
  Compliance Implementation 
Country 2012 2014 2012 2014 
Regional Mean 47.56757 49 53.15789 54.21053 
Malaysia 40 42 40 40 
Australia 90 92 100 100 
Bangladesh 54 54 60 60 
Bhutan 32 32 40 40 
Brunei 35 35 40 40 
Cambodia 41 41 40 40 
China 63 64 40 40 
Fiji 50 53 60 60 
India 40 41 100 100 
Indonesia 55 55 40 40 
Japan 70 76 100 100 
Korea, Dem People's Rep of 30 30 0 0 
Korea, Republic of 82 82 100 100 
Laos 32 34 40 40 
Mongolia 69 69 60 60 
Myanmar 21 23 40 40 
Nepal 27 27 40 40 
New Zealand 85 86 80 80 
Pakistan 43 46 80 80 
Papua New Guinea 25 27 40 40 
Philippines 53 55 40 40 
Samoa 33 33 40 40 
Singapore 60 60 100 100 
Solomon Islands 31 33 60 60 
Sri Lanka 49 48 60 60 
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 Malaysia is party to a number of regional agreements including Asia 
Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), and the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Of 
these, the most useful for predicting Malaysian compliance is the ASEAN.247 Table 9 
illustrates that Malaysia’s compliance is in line with the other ASEAN nations (except 
the obvious outlier Singapore) and consistent with the ASEAN mean. Like observed in 
the Argentina case study, the regional influence is subtler than geography. The formal 
regional links through international organizations correlates with compliance levels for 
member nations. 
  
                                                          
247 ASEAN Aims and Purposes, http://asean.org/asean/about-asean/ (accessed April 14, 2017). 
As set out in the ASEAN Declaration, the aims and purposes of ASEAN are: (1) To accelerate the 
economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region…; (2) To promote 
regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law…; (3) To 
promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common…; (4) To provide 
assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities…; (5) To collaborate more 
effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their 
trade…; (6) To promote Southeast Asian studies; and (7) To maintain close and beneficial 
cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and 
purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves. 
 
Taiwan 58 63 0 40 
Thailand 39 31 40 40 
Timor-Leste 22 25 20 20 
Tonga 38 37 60 60 
Vanuatu 30 33 40 40 
Vietnam 37 51 40 40 
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Table 9: ASEAN Nation Compliance 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter offered an in-depth look at the NP regime through the lens 
of three nations with a close nexus to it. Two of these nations, Argentina and 
South Africa, have a defined nuclear nexus in that they both use nuclear power 
and pursued (successfully in South Africa) nuclear weapons.  A third state, 
Malaysia, is a transit state and sits astride one of the world’s busiest shipping 
corridors. While never pursuing nuclear power or nuclear weapons, 
proliferation requires transit and a nation that sees millions of containers 
passing through each year, like Malaysia, is an ideal place to surreptitiously 
move such material. 
If the goal of this chapter was solely to confirm the insights gained from 
the previous chapter containing the empirical study, the case studies would be 
a failure. This chapter, however, has provided more insights into the influences 
on national compliance with the NP regime. These factors potentially influence 
 
Country 2012 2014 2012 2014
Regional Mean 41.3 42.7 46 45
Malaysia 40 42 40 40
Brunei 35 35 40 30
Cambodia 41 41 40 40
Indonesia 55 55 40 40
Laos 32 34 40 40
Myanmar 21 23 40 40
Philippines 53 55 40 40
Singapore 60 60 100 100
Thailand 39 31 40 40
Vietnam 37 51 40 40
ASEAN Nations
Compliance Implementation
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compliance with all security regimes. The empirical studies lent weight to 
hypotheses emphasizing compliance is a function of a nation’s respect for rule 
of law and the level of compliance in a region. Such results were consistent 
with liberal theories of peace and the international system.  
The case studies indicate something deeper going on within nations. 
UNSCR 1540 dives into sovereignty with a mandate to enact domestic 
legislation. The case studies lend weight to a constructivist view of nations. 
How does a nation perceive its own identity? What are the influencers and 
what is important to it? 
Argentina is well above the regional average for both NP regime 
compliance and UNSCR 1540 implementation. Argentina’s longtime rival, 
Brazil, mirrors these compliance levels. Between these two nations, is there 
something more powerful than the region influencing compliance? In this 
instance, rival compliance might be more powerful. If so, this indicates 
Argentina (and possibly Brazil) identify themselves with reference to their rival, 
and, in neorealist fashion, will not let the other have a relative gain in 
international prestige. Another plausible explanation comes from trade 
literature. Argentina’s main trading partners all score high in compliance. In 
order to maintain these relationships Argentina may mimic their compliance, 
removing a potential barrier to continued trade. Perhaps most telling on 
Argentinian compliance is the nation’s membership in regional international 
organizations. From the many and varied agreements that bind nations in the 
Americas, with Latin heritage, and exclusively on the South American 
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Continent emerges regional influences not explainable by geography or 
membership in the UN. 
Trade seems a likely factor in South Africa’s compliance as well. A large 
part of the South African trade is in precious materials like gold, platinum, and 
diamonds. Some of these may be sanction-proof, but having been subject to 
years of suppressed trade due to apartheid, which ended less than 30 years 
ago, South Africa may consciously adopt a non-controversial role. Region too 
could be a factor if operationalized differently. South Africa’s contiguous 
neighbors reflect similar compliance with it.  
A changed regional operationalization could also better predict 
compliance levels in Malaysia. Simply removing the regional outliers – and 
distant nations – of Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan placed 
Malaysia’s compliance level in line with the remaining nations. Malaysian 
compliance is also explained by theories of regional hegemony with China or 
India leading the way. Yet, like Argentina, Malaysia appears most influenced by 
its regional international organization memberships, particularly the ASEAN. 
Compliance is not a wooden shoe – individually built for each nation. 
These case studies illuminate that predicting individual compliance is more 
complex than system compliance, and illustrate the danger of ecological fallacy. 
Predicting the individual behavior based upon that of the system clearly 
produces poor results. International relations, like thoroughbred handicapping, 
is most revealing with in-depth research on individual cases. While the case 
studies proved disappointing for their ability to support the empirical results, 
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they have each raised additional hypotheses, possibilities and opportunities for 
further research – even within this existing data set. 
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Six: Conclusions 
This dissertation addressed the question: What factors help predict the 
potential for a nation to comply with an international security regime?  Using 
the NP regime as a lens through which to examine this topic, I specifically 
focused on UNSCR 1540. UNSCR 1540 calls upon member nations to establish 
and enforce domestic legislation to counter the proliferation of WMD to non-
state actors. This resolution is unique in that it specifically targets domestic 
laws – a particular issue of sovereignty. The intention of UNSCR 1540 is to 
enable the NP regime by catalyzing nations into compliance. 
There are four sections in this chapter. The first section reviews findings 
that emerged from the quantitative and qualitative analysis. The second section 
addresses the implications of these findings on predicting compliance and 
perhaps even developing conditions conducive to compliance. Translating these 
into actions for policymakers engaged in securing security regime compliance 
is the focus of the third section. The final section of this chapter discusses 
areas ripe for future research. 
Review of Findings 
 I used the term institutionalization as the lens through which to 
determine regime success.  Institutionalization occurs when members adhere 
to a regime’s norms, rather than simply follow its rules and procedures.248 
Compliance differs from institutionalization because it is a measure of state 
                                                          
248 Roger K. Smith, “Institutionalization as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 229. 
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action in accordance with rules and procedures; institutionalization is 
compliance that references rules and procedures for form, not for obligation. 
UNSCR 1540 is an attempt to change a nation, by mandating changes in 
domestic law, and enable institutionalization. There are relatively few nations 
with a direct nexus to nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. For a 
nation with no nexus, compliance with the NP regime is not difficult. By 
institutionalizing compliance through implementation of UNSCR 1540’s tenets, 
a nation without current WMD nexus is now better prepared for future WMD-
related challenges. This is particularly relevant to transit nations. 
Thus, this dissertation explored the factors that predict both compliance 
with the NP regime and implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the goal of 
determining country characteristics that indicate success. The literature points 
to rule of law and regional compliance as dominant indicators. This led to a 
two-part - quantitative and qualitative - analysis and evaluation. I proposed 
hypotheses that incorporated these factors. The first hypothesis predicted 
increased compliance with the NP regime if a nation scored high in rule of law 
and/or had a place in a region of complaint neighbors. The second hypothesis 
addressed institutionalization of the NP regime directly by using the same 
predictors and looking at national compliance actions demanded by UNSCR 
1540 with regard to WMD activities.  
The results of these analyses indicated a strong relationship between 
rule of law and regional compliance and a nation’s compliance with the overall 
NP regime. Using the specific implementation of UNSCR 1540 as a dependent 
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variable delivered consistent results. These results indicate a nation will 
institutionalize the NP norms, and comply with the specifics of implementation. 
The second part of the analysis was qualitative. I first culled the universe 
of nations down to 84 potential proliferating nations based upon either primary 
origin or transit nation status. I then selected a country from the high, 
medium, and low levels of the WGI rule of law measure in order to validate in 
prose the quantitative analysis. The results of in-depth analysis of Argentina, 
South Africa, and Malaysia showed that predicting an individual nation’s 
compliance is more complex than descriptions of government capacity or 
geography. Argentina and South Africa, expected by the hypotheses to exhibit 
low to medium compliance and implementation, scored high and well above 
their region for both measures. Malaysia, expected to score high in compliance, 
was disappointingly low. 
These results are the opposite of what the quantitative analysis revealed 
and indicate other factors influence compliance. Regional compliance, however, 
remained strong suggesting predictive factors reside in national attributes 
other than rule of law. I place greater weight on the relationships nations have 
as influencers of their compliance. Most nations are states of the world in that 
they have international connections through trade or other agreements. Yet, 
the three case studies seemed to point more toward economics than region as a 
prime influencer of compliance. The existence or absence of a government that 
supported a robust rule of law did not matter in the three cases presented. 
Malaysia, the state with the highest scores for rule of law scored the lowest on 
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compliance. Argentina and South Africa were in the middle and lower thirds for 
rule of law (with South Africa probably on the decline) exhibited some of the 
highest compliance levels. Something other than rule of law, therefore, must 
influence. 
Implications 
These results lend weight to liberal theories of international relations, 
specifically liberal ideas of cooperation as reflected in regime theory. UNSCR 
1540 mandates changes to domestic legislation in an effort to further the 
principles and norms of proliferation. Of course, the enactment of legislation 
relies upon domestic politics. The quantitative results support theories that 
domestic politics determine state action. As rule of law scores rise, the 
incidence of NP compliance rises. These results using region as a predictor also 
support cooperation-based theories. Regional compliance is still a good 
predictor - indicating nations within a region are acting in similarly. 
The qualitative results support liberal theories of compliance, however, 
they do so for reasons other than those found in the quantitative chapter. The 
case studies point toward influences other than rule of law as predictors of 
compliance. All three nations studied exhibited compliance levels contrary to 
that predicted by the quantitative research. This points to cooperation as a 
dominant predictor. The difficulty is in discerning “cooperation with what?” The 
possibilities include trade cooperation, cultural influences, and cooperation 
with contiguous nations. For Argentina, it has a very beneficial relationship 
with former rival Brazil. South Africa capitalizes on its historical relationships 
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with western nations. Malaysia mirrors its neighbors while engaging in 
tremendous amounts of container trade. 
Argentina and Brazil have many international connections, yet their 
compliance levels are similar and both well above the regional mean. With 
fewer countries than the other regions, the South American region is relatively 
straightforward to observe. In addition, the region shares culture and even 
exhibits language similarities, something not found in other regions. These 
nations are longtime military rivals and now deep trading partners. They both 
have a defined nuclear nexus. In this region, the easily observable relationships 
among nations point toward cooperation across topics as beneficial to each. 
The NP regime benefits from a history of cooperation and compliance in other 
arenas, like the Mercosur agreements starting in 1991, as evidenced by 
Argentina’s 1994 ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a 
prohibition on nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Argentina 
was second only to Cuba as the final holdout from this treaty that went into 
effect in 1968 
Observations of South Africa and Malaysia are not nearly as clear-cut as 
that of Argentina. South Africa is unique in a very diverse and geographically 
large region, even among its closest neighbors. It has a history not shared by 
any others that includes centuries of privileged status among European 
nations. Within the last 30 years, it has transitioned from apartheid to true 
democracy. Thus, South Africa does not share culture (nor even language) with 
its neighbors. Observing relationships among the nations in the African regions 
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is difficult and requires inferential analysis. Insights gained from Argentina 
allow me to discount rule of law as the predictor of South African compliance. 
Similarly, results from Malaysia allow me to discount rule of law as a 
primary predictor of compliance and look deeper into the reasons Malaysia 
exhibits such low levels of compliance. Malaysia’s region is probably as diverse 
as that of South Africa, yet Malaysia has close relationships and shared culture 
with its neighbors. The ASEAN nations those with the closest geographic, 
cultural, and trade ties with Malaysia exhibit compliance levels consistent with 
those of Malaysia. This implies that close geographic proximity is but a factor 
in compliance with culture and other ties serving as more dominant predictors. 
Policymaking 
How should policymakers use this research? First, they must recognize 
that institutionalization of the principles and norms of the NP regime demands 
patience. There are timelines and compliance measures associated with UNSCR 
1540 that are supported by a robust committee within the UN. This body 
closely monitors and regularly reports on implementation. The UNSC enacted 
this resolution under Chapter VII authority which authorizes uses of force to 
ensure compliance. Yet there is little chance the UN will punish nations who 
fail to comply with the reporting and enactment mandates. Compliance, 
therefore, must be meaningful for a nation. Worldwide compliance will develop 
incrementally. US policymakers should focus on nations with which the US 
has close economic ties. If non-compliant, the US needs to encourage and 
facilitate compliance both bilaterally and through the UN methods. The UN will 
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provide support for a nation’s efforts to draft appropriate legislation and 
education for officials charged with enforcement.  
Next, policymakers need to evaluate the geographic and other factors, 
like shared culture, ethnicity, trade, and regional agreements that bind 
nations. This will identify “close nations” or those that exert influence on the 
targeted country. If a close nation is compliant, then US policy makers need to 
encourage that nation to advocate to non-compliant nations with which it has 
ties not shared by the US. South Africa is a nation ripe for such an approach. 
It is UNSCR 1540 compliant, but its neighbors are not. South Africa has close 
economic ties to three western nations that are also very compliant, the US, the 
UK, and Germany. This method, like the oil stain theory of counter-insurgency, 
should slowly build more universal compliance. Compliance with the legislative 
mandates of UNSCR 1540 sets the stage for a nation to enforce. This creates a 
non-permissive state environment for potential proliferators. 
Future Research 
Future studies should redefine regions in two ways. First, the geographic 
regions are too big, and this dilutes the value of the indicator. Africa, for 
example, should become two or even three regions, Saharan, Sub-Saharan, 
and South African. Such delineations would allow the researcher a more robust 
ability to tease out the regional influences nations have upon each other.  
The second regional redefinition is economic. Grouping nations by their 
economic ties will allow the researcher to investigate this important influence. 
The international ties of many dominant economic engines like the US and 
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China will have these nations in many economic “regions.” This will drive 
examination of the most influential nation and likely tie in geographic regional 
influence as well. 
These results need validation against other security regimes then other 
regimes. A good starting point is the Humanitarian Security Regime (HSR). Like 
the NP Regime, the HSR consists of a patchwork of agreements within an 
“overarching goal of creating a framework for the reduction of human 
suffering.”249 There are multiple component parts of the HSR of which the most 
prominent are the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and 
the Arms Trade Treaty. Unlike the NP Regime, the focus of the HSR is all of 
humanity, not issues involving discreet states. The HSR attempts to change the 
focus of arms control treaties from the national security calculation of 
individual states to a focus on the benefits for humanity. Examination of the 
HSR regime and validation of the findings herein provides a logical bridge 
between security regimes and regimes with other foci. 
It was the goal of this dissertation to identify factors contributing to the 
institutionalization of non-proliferation norms around the world. The 
qualitative studies did not explicitly validate the hypotheses about rule of law’s 
role in compliance. Yet the research ultimately captures the essential 
predictors of regime implementation and offers researchers and policymakers a 
starting point for prospective NP efforts. This better understanding of 
                                                          
249 Denise Garcia, “Global Norms on Arms: The Significance of the Arms Trade Treaty for Global 
Security in World Politics”, Global Policy 5: 4 (2014), 426. 
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institutionalization will enable a credible determination of whether an 
international regime is or how it can be successful.   
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Appendix A: Alternate Rule of Law Indicators 
 
The first alternate rule of law indicator is Contract Intensive Money 
(RoLCIM). I created this variable using the same methods as Clague, et.al. 
Using the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), I created the CIM measure used in this analysis by subtracting 
M1 from M2 then dividing by M2 [(M2-M1)/M2.] The US Federal Reserve 
defines M1 as the most liquid component of the money supply, as it primarily 
consists of cash and other on-demand forms of money.250 M2 includes 
elements of money that are less liquid, such as savings deposits, money 
markets, and mutual funds that are not as suitable for rapid exchange.251 The 
variable derived from these measures of money directly relates to the rule of 
law and the confidence investors have in the enforcement of contract. In 
countries with weaker rule of law indicators, individuals will be more reliant on 
cash.  
 Using the same equations as in the main article, I re-ran the analyses 
and found robust support for the rule of law variable. The results appear at 
Table A1, below. While the model’s goodness of fit indicator is slightly higher 
than when I place it beside the results of the model using the World 
Governance indicators measure (adjusted R2 of .574 versus .516), there is also 
a strong relationship between compliance and the political competitiveness 
                                                          
250 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Money Stock Measures – H.6, January 7, 
2016, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/current/default.htm (accessed January 11, 
2016). 
251 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Money Stock Measures. 
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within a government. This indicates that democracies with a high competitive 
participation score will tend to comply with the NP regime.  
Despite the strength of the relationship between Contract Intensive 
Money and NP Compliance, this variable does not have a statistically 
significant impact on UNSCR 1540 implementation (see Table 2/H1b). The fact 
that money is safe, and contracts enforceable in functioning courts, does not 
predict implementation with the specifics of UNSCR 1540. However, the 
competitive political participation and regional mean variables retain 
significance. These results indicate that a nation could be respectful of the rule 
of law and a competitive participatory democracy, yet fail to implement UNSCR 
1540, just like its neighbors. . The goodness of fit indicator – which was robust 
in the WGI model – is even (adjusted R2 of .608 to. 639). As in the compliance 
model, above, the competitiveness of government is not, comparatively, very 
explanatory.  
The second alternate indicator I used as a rule of law proxy was 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
(RoL_CPI_Corrupt).252 This is a composite indicator that uses 13 different data 
measures from 12 sources that “capture[s] perceptions of corruption” in the 
public sector of over 170 nations.253 This indicator shares a close relationship 
                                                          
252 As noted above, the WGI data includes a “Control of Corruption” indicator. I chose not to 
use this because, the six WGI categories are “strongly positively correlated across countries” 
and thus it made sense to seek a different source. Kaufmann, et.al. “The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators…,” 7. 
253 Transparency International, “Corruptions Perception Index 2016: Technical Methodology 
Note,” http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 
(accessed January 31, 2017). 
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with WGI’s rule of law indicator. A recent study explored the relationship 
among corruption, democracy, and bureaucracy, using the CPI as a dependent 
variable and WGI’s rule of law indicator as an independent variable. The results 
were intuitive, showing that a higher rule of law decreases corruption.254 
This indicator proved to be the least valuable of the three for explaining 
compliance with the non-proliferation regime. In terms of goodness of fit, the 
explanatory power of the model dropped (from .574 to .476) with regional 
compliance and political competitiveness taking on a larger role in the results. 
For Hypothesis 2, the goodness of fit results almost equaled the results of the 
WGI indicators and proved more robust than the CIM measure (R2 of .637 
versus .608). Yet, the CPI rule of law measure, like the WGI variable, paired 
with regional mean provides more explanatory power than the CIM rule of law 
measure. 
These results naturally lead to further areas for study. The WGI indicator 
includes some corruption indicators within it. Langbein and Knack conducted 
both analyses of the WGI dataset holistically and the subcategories and 
concluded the WGI measures are so overlapping that they were almost 
identical.255 Thus, using the CPI indicators allows for some differentiation 
between corruption measures within the two databases. The lack of corruption 
(“the extent to which power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
                                                          
254 Aviral Kumar Tiwari, “Corruption, Democracy and Bureaucracy,” Theoretical and Applied 
Economics XIX, no. 9 (2012), 26. 
255 Laura Langbein and Stephen Knack, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Six, One, or 
None?” Journal of Development Studies 46, No. 2 (2008), 365. 
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and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests.”)256 appears as a good indicator that a state will comply with 
the finer aspects of UNSCR 1540 implementation. This includes the exacting 
reporting requirements as well as enacting and enforcing counter- and non-
proliferation legislation. In a highly corrupt state, government officials – those 
primarily responsible for activities such as implementation reporting – are loyal 
and usually beholden to elites. Thus, their loyalty is not to the state or system, 
but to an individual.
                                                          
256 Kaufmann, et.al. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators…,” 6. 
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Table A1: Regression Results, Contract Intensive Money 
 
Variable H1a: NTI Index H1b: 1540 Implementation Score 
 Coeff Std Error P>|z
| 
95% Conf 
Interval 
Coeff Std 
Error 
P>|z
| 
95% Conf 
Interval 
Rule of Law (Contract 
Intensive Money) 
13.101 4.614 .005 4.058 22.14
4 
4.432 6.099 .467 -7.522 16.386 
Competitiveness w/in 
Govt 
.264 .064 .000 .139 .388 .297 .113 .008 .076 .517 
Regional Compliance 
Mean 
.966 .041 .000 .886 1.047 1.112 .062 .000 .991 1.233 
Constant -2.526 3.627 .486 -9.635 4.583 -4.667 5.511 .397 -15.469 6.136 
Goodness of Fit R2 = .580 Adjusted R2 = .574 R2 = .613 Adjusted R2 = .608 
 
Table A2: Regression Results, Corruption Perceptions Index 
 
Variable H1a: NTI Index H1b: 1540 Implementation Score 
 Coeff Std Error P>|z| 95% Conf Interval Coeff Std 
Error 
P>|z| 95% Conf Interval 
Rule of Law (Corruption 
Perceptions Index) 
.653 .038 .000 .579 .728 .468 .049 .000 .373 .563 
Competitiveness w/in 
Govt 
.103 .051 .04 .003 .203 .094 .069 .171 -.041 .228 
Regional Compliance 
Mean 
-36.232 13.164 .006 -62.034 -10.431 .915 .052 .000 .812 1.017 
Constant -2.526 3.627 .486 -9.635 4.583 -12.525 2.979 .000 -18.364 -6.685 
Goodness of Fit R2 = .483 Adjusted R2 = .476 R2 = 641 Adjusted R2 = .637 
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Appendix B: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistic
Name  Description Expected 
Direction 
Source Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
 NTI Nuclear Materials 
Security Index 
(NTI_Index) 
This is an ordinal measure with 
possibilities from 0 to 100 that 
evaluates legal, institutional, and 
implementation factors of a 
country's compliance with the NP 
regime. 
  Nuclear Threat 
Initiative Database 
352 54.792 21.233      7 99 
UNSCR 1540 
Implementation 
(NTI_1540_n) 
This is an ordinal measure from 0 
to 100 in increments of 10; 
includes the sub-indicators of 
UNSCR 1540 reporting and Extent 
of UNSCR 1540 implementation. 
 Nuclear Threat 
Initiative Database 
360 55 32.320           0 100 
Independent and Control Variables      
Contract Intensive 
Money (RoLCIM) 
This ratio measure between 0 and 
1 shows the strength of law and 
order within a nation as a function 
demand for cash transactions.  
Positive International 
Monetary Fund’s 
International 
Financial Statistics 
230 .489     .204     .024    .891 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (RoL_WGI) 
This ratio measure between 0 and 
5  shows confidence in contract 
enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts,  
Positive World Bank and 
Brookings 
Institution 
421 2.488 .995 .055 4.621 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index (RoL_CPI_Corrupt) 
This is an ordinal measure from 0 
to 100 that indicates the 
perceptions of corruption in a 
country. It is a composite measure.  
Positive Transparency 
International 
343 42.799 19.560 8 92 
Competitiveness of 
Participation (parcomp) 
This ordinal measure identifies the 
competitiveness of the political 
system. It is coded from 1 
(repressed) to 5 (competitive)  
Positive Polity IV Democracy 
Index 
334     .341     15.531         1         5 
Proportion of Regional 
Compliance NTI Index 
(regNTImean) 
This ratio variable is coded 0 to 1 
in percentages.  
Positive Self-generated 
based upon the 
sample, year, and 
the COW regions. 
352     54.793     
15.056   
 
39.128    
 
80.233 
Proportion of Regional 
Compliance UNSCR 
Compliance 
(regNTI1540mean) 
This ratio variable is coded 0 to 1 
in percentages. 
Positive Self-generated 
based upon the 
sample, year, and 
the COW regions. 
360     53.495     22.461    24.583    91.111 
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Appendix C 
Included Countries Contract Intensive Money 
1. Afghanistan 
2. Albania 
3. Algeria 
4. Angola 
5. Argentina 
6. Armenia 
7. Austria 
8. Azerbaijan 
9. Bahamas 
10. Bahrain 
11. Bangladesh 
12. Belarus 
13. Belgium 
14. Belize 
15. Benin 
16. Bhutan 
17. Bolivia 
18. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
19. Botswana 
20. Bulgaria 
21. Burundi 
22. Cambodia 
23. Cameroon 
24. Central African 
Republic 
25. Chad 
26. Chile 
27. China 
28. Colombia 
29. Comoros 
30. Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
31. Congo 
(Democratic 
Republic of) 
32. Costa Rica 
33. Cyprus 
34. Czech Republic 
35. Denmark 
36. Dominican 
Republic 
37. Ecuador 
38. Egypt 
39. El Salvador 
40. Equatorial 
Guinea 
41. Estonia 
42. Finland 
43. France 
44. Gabon 
45. Gambia 
46. Germany 
47. Greece 
48. Guatemala 
49. Guyana 
50. Haiti 
51. Honduras 
52. Hungary 
53. Iceland 
54. Indonesia 
55. Iraq 
56. Ireland 
57. Israel 
58. Italy 
59. Jamaica 
60. Japan 
61. Jordan 
62. Kazakhstan 
63. Kenya 
64. Korea, Republic 
of 
65. Kuwait 
66. Kyrgyz Republic 
67. Latvia 
68. Lebanon 
69. Lesotho 
70. Lithuania 
71. Luxembourg 
72. Macedonia 
73. Malawi 
74. Malaysia 
75. Malta 
76. Mexico 
77. Moldova 
78. Mongolia 
79. Morocco 
80. Mozambique 
81. Namibia 
82. Nepal 
83. Netherlands 
84. New Zealand 
85. Nicaragua 
86. Nigeria 
87. Oman 
88. Pakistan 
89. Paraguay 
90. Peru 
91. Portugal 
92. Qatar 
93. Romania 
94. Russia 
95. Singapore 
96. Slovakia 
97. Slovenia 
98. South Africa 
99. Spain 
100. Sri Lanka 
101. Sudan 
102. Suriname 
103. Swaziland 
104. Sweden 
105. Switzerland 
106. Tajikistan 
107. Tanzania 
108. Tonga 
109. Turkey 
110. Uganda 
111. United States 
112. Uruguay 
113. Vanuatu 
114. Venezuela 
115. Zambia 
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Included Countries World Governance Indicators 
1. Afghanistan 
2. Albania 
3. Algeria 
4. American Samoa 
5. Andorra 
6. Angola 
7. Anguilla 
8. Antigua And 
Barbuda 
9. Argentina 
10. Armenia 
11. Aruba 
12. Australia 
13. Austria 
14. Azerbaijan 
15. Bahamas 
16. Bahrain 
17. Bangladesh 
18. Barbados 
19. Belarus 
20. Belgium 
21. Belize 
22. Benin 
23. Bermuda 
24. Bhutan 
25. Bolivia 
26. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
27. Botswana 
28. Brazil 
29. Brunei 
30. Bulgaria 
31. Burkina Faso 
32. Burundi 
33. Cambodia 
34. Cameroon 
35. Canada 
36. Cape Verde 
37. Cayman Islands 
38. Central African 
Republic 
39. Chad 
40. Chile 
41. China 
42. Colombia 
43. Comoros 
44. Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
45. Congo 
(Democratic 
Republic of) 
46. Cook Islands 
47. Costa Rica 
48. Croatia 
49. Cuba 
50. CÙte d'Ivoire 
51. Cyprus 
52. Czech Republic 
53. Denmark 
54. Djibouti 
55. Dominica 
56. Dominican 
Republic 
57. Ecuador 
58. Egypt 
59. El Salvador 
60. Equatorial 
Guinea 
61. Eritrea 
62. Estonia 
63. Ethiopia 
64. Fiji 
65. Finland 
66. France 
67. French Guiana 
68. Gabon 
69. Gambia 
70. Georgia 
71. Germany 
72. Ghana 
73. Greece 
74. Greenland 
75. Grenada 
76. Guam 
77. Guatemala 
78. Guinea 
79. Guinea-Bissau 
80. Guyana 
81. Haiti 
82. Honduras 
83. Hong Kong Sar, 
China 
84. Hungary 
85. Iceland 
86. India 
87. Indonesia 
88. Iran 
89. Iraq 
90. Ireland 
91. Israel 
92. Italy 
93. Jamaica 
94. Japan 
95. Jersey, Channel 
Islands 
96. Jordan 
97. Kazakhstan 
98. Kenya 
99. Kiribati 
100. Korea, Dem 
People's Rep of 
101. Korea, Republic 
of 
102. Kosovo 
103. Kuwait 
104. Kyrgyz Republic 
105. Laos 
106. Latvia 
107. Lebanon 
108. Lesotho 
109. Liberia 
110. Libya 
111. Liechtenstein 
112. Lithuania 
113. Luxembourg 
114. Macao Sar, 
China 
115. Macedonia 
116. Madagascar 
117. Malawi 
118. Malaysia 
119. Maldives 
120. Mali 
121. Malta 
122. Marshall Islands 
123. Martinique 
124. Mauritania 
125. Mauritius 
126. Mexico 
127. Micronesia, Fed. 
Sts. 
128. Moldova 
129. Monaco 
130. Mongolia 
131. Montenegro 
132. Morocco 
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133. Mozambique 
134. Myanmar 
135. Namibia 
136. Nauru 
137. Nepal 
138. Netherlands 
139. Netherlands 
Antilles (Former) 
140. New Zealand 
141. Nicaragua 
142. Niger 
143. Nigeria 
144. Niue 
145. Norway 
146. Oman 
147. Pakistan 
148. Palau 
149. Panama 
150. Papua New 
Guinea 
151. Paraguay 
152. Peru 
153. Philippines 
154. Poland 
155. Portugal 
156. Qatar 
157. Romania 
158. Russia 
159. Rwanda 
160. Samoa 
161. Sao TomÈ and 
PrÌncipe 
162. Saudi Arabia 
163. Senegal 
164. Serbia 
165. Serbia 
166. Seychelles 
167. Sierra Leone 
168. Singapore 
169. Slovakia 
170. Slovenia 
171. Solomon Islands 
172. Somalia 
173. South Africa 
174. South Sudan 
175. Spain 
176. Sri Lanka 
177. St. Kitts And 
Nevis 
178. St. Lucia 
179. St. Vincent And 
The Grenadines 
180. Sudan 
181. Suriname 
182. Swaziland 
183. Sweden 
184. Switzerland 
185. Syria 
186. Taiwan 
187. Tajikistan 
188. Tanzania 
189. Thailand 
190. Timor-Leste 
191. Togo 
192. Tonga 
193. Trinidad and 
Tobago 
194. Tunisia 
195. Turkey 
196. Turkmenistan 
197. Tuvalu 
198. Uganda 
199. Ukraine 
200. United Arab 
Emirates 
201. United Kingdom 
202. United States 
203. Uruguay 
204. Uzbekistan 
205. Vanuatu 
206. Venezuela 
207. Vietnam 
208. Yemen 
209. Zambia 
210. Zimbabwe 
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Included Countries Corruption Perceptions Index 
 
1. Afghanistan 
2. Albania 
3. Algeria 
4. Angola 
5. Argentina 
6. Armenia 
7. Australia 
8. Austria 
9. Azerbaijan 
10. Bahamas 
11. Bahrain 
12. Bangladesh 
13. Barbados 
14. Belarus 
15. Belgium 
16. Benin 
17. Bhutan 
18. Bolivia 
19. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
20. Botswana 
21. Brazil 
22. Bulgaria 
23. Burkina Faso 
24. Burundi 
25. Cambodia 
26. Cameroon 
27. Canada 
28. Cape Verde 
29. Central African 
Republic 
30. Chad 
31. Chile 
32. China 
33. Colombia 
34. Comoros 
35. Congo (Brazzaville) 
36. Congo (Democratic 
Republic of) 
37. Costa Rica 
38. Croatia 
39. Cuba 
40. CÙte d'Ivoire 
41. Cyprus 
42. Czech Republic 
43. Denmark 
44. Djibouti 
45. Dominica 
46. Dominican 
Republic 
47. Ecuador 
48. Egypt 
49. El Salvador 
50. Eritrea 
51. Estonia 
52. Ethiopia 
53. Finland 
54. France 
55. Gabon 
56. Gambia 
57. Georgia 
58. Germany 
59. Ghana 
60. Greece 
61. Guatemala 
62. Guinea 
63. Guinea-Bissau 
64. Guyana 
65. Haiti 
66. Honduras 
67. Hungary 
68. Iceland 
69. India 
70. Indonesia 
71. Iran 
72. Iraq 
73. Ireland 
74. Israel 
75. Italy 
76. Jamaica 
77. Japan 
78. Jordan 
79. Kazakhstan 
80. Kenya 
81. Korea, Dem 
People's Rep of 
82. Korea, Republic of 
83. Kosovo 
84. Kuwait 
85. Kyrgyz Republic 
86. Laos 
87. Latvia 
88. Lebanon 
89. Lesotho 
90. Liberia 
91. Libya 
92. Lithuania 
93. Luxembourg 
94. Macedonia 
95. Madagascar 
96. Malawi 
97. Malaysia 
98. Mali 
99. Malta 
100. Mauritania 
101. Mauritius 
102. Mexico 
103. Moldova 
104. Mongolia 
105. Montenegro 
106. Morocco 
107. Mozambique 
108. Myanmar 
109. Namibia 
110. Nepal 
111. Netherlands 
112. New Zealand 
113. Nicaragua 
114. Niger 
115. Nigeria 
116. Norway 
117. Oman 
118. Pakistan 
119. Panama 
120. Papua New 
Guinea 
121. Paraguay 
122. Peru 
123. Philippines 
124. Poland 
125. Portugal 
126. Qatar 
127. Romania 
128. Russia 
129. Rwanda 
130. Samoa 
131. Saudi Arabia 
132. Senegal 
133. Serbia 
134. Serbia 
135. Seychelles 
136. Sierra Leone 
137. Singapore 
138. Slovakia 
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139. Slovenia 
140. Somalia 
141. South Africa 
142. Spain 
143. Sri Lanka 
144. Sudan 
145. Suriname 
146. Swaziland 
147. Sweden 
148. Switzerland 
149. Syria 
150. Taiwan 
151. Tajikistan 
152. Tanzania 
153. Thailand 
154. Timor-Leste 
155. Togo 
156. Trinidad and 
Tobago 
157. Tunisia 
158. Turkey 
159. Turkmenistan 
160. Uganda 
161. Ukraine 
162. United Arab 
Emirates 
163. United Kingdom 
164. United States 
165. Uruguay 
166. Uzbekistan 
167. Venezuela 
168. Vietnam 
169. Yemen 
170. Zambia 
171. Zimbabwe 
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Appendix D 
 
NTI Index Categories, Indicators, and Sub-indicators 
 
1. QUANTITIES AND SITES 
1.1. Quantities of Nuclear Materials 
1.1.1. Quantities of nuclear materials 
1.2. Sites and Transportation 
1.2.1. Number of sites 
1.2.2. Bulk processing facility 
1.2.3. Frequency of materials transport 
1.3. Material Production and Elimination Trends 
1.3.1. Material production and elimination trends 
2. SECURITY AND CONTROL MEASURES 
2.1. On-site Physical Protection 
2.1.1. Mandatory physical protection 
2.1.2. On-site reviews of security 
2.1.3. Design basis threat 
2.1.4. Security responsibilities and accountabilities 
2.1.5. Performance-based program 
2.2. Control and Accounting Procedures 
2.2.1. Legal and regulatory basis for material control and accounting 
(MC&A) 
2.2.2. Measurement methods 
2.2.3. Inventory record 
2.2.4. Material balance area(s) 
2.2.5. Control measures 
2.3. Insider Threat Prevention 
2.3.1. Personnel vetting 
2.3.2. Frequency of personnel vetting 
2.3.3. Reporting 
2.3.4. Surveillance 
2.4. Physical Security During Transport 
2.5. 2.5 Response Capabilities 
2.5.1. Emergency response capabilities 
2.5.2. Armed response capabilities 
2.5.3. Law enforcement response training 
2.5.4. Nuclear infrastructure protection plan 
3. GLOBAL NORMS 
3.1. International Legal Commitments 
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3.1.1. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) 
3.1.2. 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM 
3.1.3. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism (ICSANT) 
3.2. Voluntary Commitments 
3.2.1. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) membership 
3.2.2. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) membership 
3.2.3. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) membership 
3.2.4. G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and 
Materials of Mass Destruction membership 
3.2.5. World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) contributions 
3.2.6. IAEA Nuclear Security Fund contributions 
3.2.7. Bilateral or multilateral assistance 
3.2.8. Centers of Excellence 
3.3. International Assurances 
3.3.1. Published regulations and reports 
3.3.2. Public declarations and reports about nuclear materials 
3.3.3. Invitation(s) for review of security arrangements.1* Physical 
security during transport 
4. DOMESTIC COMMITMENTS AND CAPACITY 
4.1. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 
Implementation 
4.1.1. UNSCR 1540 reporting 
4.1.2. Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation 
4.2. Domestic Nuclear Materials Security Legislation 
4.2.1. CPPNM implementation authority 
4.2.2. National legal framework for CPPNM 
4.3. Safeguards Adherence and Compliance 
4.3.1. IAEA safeguards agreement (excluding Additional Protocol) 
4.3.2. IAEA Additional Protocol 
4.3.3. Facility exclusion from safeguards 
4.3.4. Safeguards violations 
4.4. Independent Regulatory Agency 
4.4.1. Independent regulatory agency 
5. RISK ENVIRONMENT 
5.1. Political Stability 
5.1.1. Social unrest 
5.1.2. Orderly transfers of power 
5.1.3. International disputes or tensions 
5.1.4. Armed conflict 
5.1.5. Violent demonstrations or violent civil or labor unrest 
5.2. Effective Governance 
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5.2.1. Effectiveness of the political system 
5.2.2. Quality of the bureaucracy 
5.3. Pervasiveness of Corruption 
5.3.1. Pervasiveness of corruption 
5.4. Groups Interested in Illicitly Acquiring Materials 
5.4.1. Groups interested in illicitly acquiring materials  
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